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ABSTRACT 
In the last several years, the United States has made a significant effort to improve its 
ability to conduct counterinsurgency operations in land-locked Afghanistan and primarily 
land operations in Iraq.  However, a large number of countries fighting insurgencies 
today have large maritime borders. This thesis will demonstrate how maritime 
interdiction can effectively contribute to counterinsurgency operations.  Sri Lanka 
provides a unique perspective on how to defeat an insurgency.  Through decades of trial 
and error, Sri Lanka’s final attempt to defeat the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) took less than three years.  Several elements were core to the defeat of the LTTE.  
First, the Sri Lankan government showed the political will needed to use military force to 
defeat the LTTE.  Second, the Sri Lankan Navy played a critical role in countering the 
LTTE’s arms smuggling, maritime terrorism, and piracy operations.  Third, support from 
the international community allowed Sri Lanka to handle its domestic “terrorism” 
problems without outside intervention.  Finally, the Sri Lankan Army employed an 
effective military offensive to destroy the insurgent forces.  Sri Lanka’s successful 
counterinsurgency reinforces the importance of prioritizing logistics and stands as a test 
case to calibrate U.S. assistance in future counterinsurgencies. 
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I. IMPORTANCE OF MARITIME INTERDICTION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the last several years, the United States has made a significant effort to improve 
its ability to conduct counterinsurgency operations in land-locked Afghanistan and 
primarily land operations in Iraq.  However, a large number of countries fighting 
insurgencies today have large maritime borders.1  The Philippines has been fighting 
against Abu Sayyaf and the Morro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) for several years.  
Laskar Jihad has infested Indonesia.  Jemaah Islamiah (JI) is fighting to create an Islamic 
state that would include Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, parts of Cambodia, 
southern Thailand, and southern Philippines.2  The Movement of the Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta (MEND) has been actively conducting piracy and terrorism in Nigeria.  The 
Somalia coast is home to pirates.  Insurgents in Colombia use that country’s extensive 
coastline and its network of rivers to export drugs and import arms and money.  These 
examples, together with the United States historical experience in maritime interdiction, 
demonstrate that it is folly to ignore the maritime dimensions of counterinsurgency.  
Admiral Michael Mullen addressed our future state of conflict in this way:  
Most of us at the senior level believe we live in a time of persistent 
conflict.  We don’t get to pick where we go or what conflict we’re in.  And 
in that regard, we believe that we will be engaged for the foreseeable 
future–10 or 15 or 20 years and that we will be deployable and deploying 
in places that some of us couldn’t even imagine even right now.  So it’s 
not just about winning the wars that we’re in, which is at the top of the list, 
but we’ve also got to be ready for the future.3   
Given the probability that the United States will be involved in conflict in 
countries with significant maritime borders, it is important to establish how the Navy can 
 
                                                 
1 Michael Lindberg and Daniel Todd, Brown-, Green-, and Blue-Water Fleets: The Influence of 
Geography on Naval Warfare, 1861 to the Present (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2001), 242. 
2 Martin N. Murphy, “Maritime Threat: Tactics and Technology of the Sea Tigers,” JANE'S 
INTELLIGENCE REVIEW (01 June 2006), http://search.janes.com (accessed 09/04/2009). 
3 Michael Mullen, “JCS Speech: Naval Postgraduate School Hall of Fame Induction Ceremony,” (11 
August 2009) http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?ID=1231 (accessed 09/06/2009). 
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effectively contribute to the complex world of counterinsurgency.  This chapter will 
demonstrate how maritime interdiction can effectively contribute to counterinsurgency 
operations. 
B. PURPOSE OF MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONS 
Maritime interdiction is used in the full range of military operations, from 
belligerent actions such as blockades to more coercive actions such as sanctions 
enforcement.  Joint Publication 3-03 describes interdiction operations as “actions to 
divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy an enemy’s surface capabilities before they can be used 
effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives.”4  In the current 
threat environment, the maritime role in counterinsurgency operations is likely to prove 
critical in future conflicts.  “Three-quarters of the world’s population, four-fifths of its 
capital cities, and almost all of the world’s productive capacity” is located within two 
hundred miles of the coast.5  Many of these areas are replete with political, social, and 
economic conflict that tends to lead to insurgencies.6  Additionally, insurgencies are 
rarely, if ever, self-sufficient.  The maritime domain provides insurgents and terrorists 
with an environment to conduct illicit activities to support their operations.  They require 
funding, weapons, equipment, food and other resources to conduct operations 
successively.  Insurgencies that are dependent on external support are vulnerable to 
interdiction.7  Isolating the enemy by attacking their critical vulnerabilities and centers of 
gravity effectively weakens their capability to fight.8  Exploiting logistics networks by 
severing enemy lines of communication (LOC) and degrading command, control, 
communication, and information capabilities would effectively weaken an insurgency’s 
                                                 
4 JOINT STAFF, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations (Washington DC: 1997), 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA357795 (accessed 11/20/2009). 
5 CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, The U.S. Navy's Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges 
(Washington DC: 2010), http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA514782 (accessed 04/10/2010). 
6 Martin N. Murphy, “The Blue, Green, and Brown: Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency on the 
Water,” CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 28, no. 1 (2007), 63–79, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1352326071240351 (accessed 11/13/2009). 
7 JOINT STAFF, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations. 
8 Paul J. Wille, Operational Isolation of the Enemy in Offensive Urban Operations (Newport, RI: 
Naval War College, 2000), http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA378659 (accessed 11/20/2009). 
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ability to conduct operations, enabling ground forces to move in and defeat the insurgent 
forces during a weakened state.9  “Successful operations may depend on successful 
interdiction operations; for instance, to isolate the battle or weaken the enemy force 
before battle is fully joined.”10  Furthermore, maritime interdiction has the added 
advantage of protecting the host nation from insurgent destabilization.11   
C. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF MARITIME INTERDICTION   
British, French, and American histories all document the importance of maritime 
interdiction in counterinsurgencies.  The British experience began in the American 
Revolutionary War and continued through most of the Cold War era in campaigns 
including Palestine, Aden, Oman, Malaysia, and Northern Ireland.12  France, likewise, 
had extensive experience with maritime interdiction in counterinsurgencies in Southeast 
Asia and most notably during the Algerian War.13  The United States has a long history 
of conducting maritime interdiction beginning with the Barbary Wars against pirates off 
the North African coast and continuing through the Vietnam War with Operations Market 
Time and Game Warden.14  The U.S. Coast Guard has extensive experience with 
maritime interdiction from the prohibition era “Rum Wars” to today’s “War on Drugs.”  
The following briefly summarizes a few of the most relevant historical examples of 
maritime interdiction.   
1. British Involvement in the “Indonesian Confrontation” 
The Royal Navy played a decisive role in the defense of Malaysia and Singapore 
against Indonesia’s active confrontation with Malaysia (1962–1967).  In 1964, Indonesia 
                                                 
9 Paul J. Wille, Operational Isolation of the Enemy in Offensive Urban Operations (Newport, RI: 
Naval War College, 2000), http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA378659 (accessed 09/20/2009).   
10 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington DC: 2001), 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA434258 (accessed 09/10/2009). 
11 Murphy, The Blue, Green, and Brown: Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency on the Water, 63–79. 
12 Tim Benbow, “Maritime Forces and Counter-Insurgency,” Contemporary Security Policy 28, no. 1 
(April 1, 2007), 80–95, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260701240419 (accessed 09/03/2009). 
13 Bernard Estival, “The French Navy and the Algerian War,” Journal of Strategic Studies 25, no. 2 
(2002), 79–94. 
14 Murphy, The Blue, Green, and Brown: Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency on the Water, 63–79. 
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began carrying out seaborne incursions into West Malaysia to destabilize the government 
through infiltration and sabotage operations.  In order to avoid detection, Indonesian 
militants crossed the Malacca and Singapore Straits at night in sampans they captured 
from fishermen.  Once in West Malaysia, the militants either organized in groups to carry 
out attacks on government facilities or individually planted bombs to terrorize the 
population.  The attacks were meant to weaken the government politically and 
economically without devolving into full-scale war.15   
Malaysia countered the Indonesian incursions through a concerted effort by the 
British Royal Navy’s Far East Fleet, the Royal Malaysian Navy, the Marine Branch of 
the Malaysian Police Force, and the Singapore Marine Police Force.  The forces were 
employed in three lines of defense: offshore, inshore, and coastal.16   
The offshore patrols were carried out by Far East Fleet and Malaysian 
Naval ships and offshore Police craft, inshore patrols by the smaller police 
craft, and beach patrolling and coast-watching by the various police, 
military and volunteer organizations set up for this task.17 
More than fifty ships and craft were deployed each night to interdict the 
Indonesian incursions.  Maritime patrols were also flown by the Royal Air Force and 
Royal Malaysian Air Force to assist in the interdiction operations.  However, the area to 
be covered was vast compared to the resources available to prevent Indonesian incursions 
by sea.  In addition to concentrating forces in the high threat areas, intelligence was 
heavily depended on to warn of Indonesian intentions.  These efforts resulted in the 
interdiction at sea of more than 80 percent of all attempted incursions by Indonesian 
forces into West Malaysia after 1964.18   
                                                 
15 Gisborne, “Naval Operations in the Malacca and Singapore Straits 1964–66,” Naval Review 60, no. 





2. The French Experience in the Algerian War  
During the Algerian War (1954–1962), the primary mission of the French Navy 
was to cut the LOCs of insurgents attempting to smuggle arms into Algeria by conducting 
a coastal blockade.  This required more than 800 nautical miles of coastline to be 
monitored and illicit shipments to be intercepted.  Their task was complicated due to the 
high commercial traffic in the sea route that ran between Port Said and Gibraltar.  
Distinguishing from illicit activity and normal commercial traffic required a sustained 
and systematic effort.  The French were able to overcome this obstacle using intelligence 
to guide searches, aerial reconnaissance to track and report, and surface vessels to 
identify and inspect suspect vessels.  The operations required the ongoing employment of 
about 20 warships, dozens of small craft and at least 10 aircraft throughout the war.  
Their efforts resulted in the interception of 1,350 tons of military equipment, thereby 
preventing nearly all supplies of arms and ammunition from reaching insurgents in 
Algeria directly by sea.19   
3. The U.S. Experience in the Vietnam War 
During Operation Market Time (1965–1968), the United States and South 
Vietnam conducted surveillance and patrolling operations along the 1,200 miles of South 
Vietnamese coast in order to limit the seaborne smuggling of arms and supplies to the 
Vietcong.  The blockade was implemented using destroyers, minesweepers, patrol craft 
(swift boats), and patrol gunboats.  More than 700,000 vessels were inspected or boarded 
during the operation.  It was a tremendously successful coastal interdiction operation and 
resulted in the North Vietnamese being forced to use the Ho Chi Minh trail to supply the 
Vietcong in South Vietnam.20 
Operation Game Warden (1966–1968) had more limited success.  Game Warden 
attempted to control the movement of enemy personnel and cargo on the inland 
waterways of South Vietnam.  Their terrain featured more than 3,000 nautical miles of 
                                                 
19 Estival, The French Navy and the Algerian War, 79–94. 
20 Edward J. Marolda and G. Wesley Pryce, A Short History of the United States Navy and the 
Southeast Asian Conflict, 1950-1975 (Washington, D.C: Naval Historical Center, Dept. of the Navy, 1984), 
131. 
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rivers, canals, and streams of the Mekong Delta.  This transportation network spread 
throughout most of South Vietnam and was more reliable than the limited road and rail 
infrastructure.  The River Patrol Force (Task Force 116) consisted of river patrol boats 
(PBR), minesweeping boats (MSB), SEAL Teams, a helicopter detachment, and 
amphibious landing ships converted to provide floating bases for the riverine forces.  
Game Warden operations were limited to the vital water passages of Rung Sat and the 
large Mekong Delta Rivers.  Most operations consisted of checking the cargo and 
paperwork of boat traffic, conducting night ambushes at enemy crossing points, and 
enforcing curfew restrictions.  With only 140 PBRs on the larger inland waterways, 
Game Warden forces boarded and inspected more than 400,000 vessels resulting in the 
interdiction of 2,000 Viet Cong craft and the capture or killing of over 1,400 enemy 
personnel.  Their significant efforts forced the Viet Cong to use less efficient 
transportation routes on the smaller rivers and canals.21   
4. The U.S. Coast Guard’s Role in the “Rum War” 
The U.S. Constitution’s 18th Amendment made the manufacture, sale, and 
transportation of alcohol illegal in the United States from 1920 to the end of 1933.  
During the Prohibition era, manufacturing and importing liquor became a very lucrative 
criminal business.  Although liquor continued to be manufactured locally through illegal 
stills, the “principal trade in illegal alcohol occurred through the importation of foreign 
alcohol into the U.S. by sea.”22  Foreign manufacturers readily supplied the alcohol either 
directly, in the case of “Rum Row” off the coast of New York, or indirectly by mass 
importation into tiny Caribbean countries that later transferred the liquor to the United 
States through organized crime syndicates.  Unable to interdict even 5 percent of the 
illegal flow of liquor, by 1924 the U.S. Coast Guard substantially expanded its fleet and 
                                                 
21 Edward J. Marolda and G. Wesley Pryce, A Short History of the United States Navy and the 
Southeast Asian Conflict, 1950-1975 (Washington, D.C: Naval Historical Center, Dept. of the Navy, 1984), 
131. 
22 Eric S. Ensign, Russell G. Swenson and Robert E. Kramerk, Intelligence in the Rum War at Sea, 
1920-1933 (Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2001), 92, 
http://www.dia.mil/college/pubs/38038.htm (accessed 09/20/2009). 
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took on counter-smuggling operations as its primary mission.23  Even as the Coast Guard 
increased to 330 vessels, they had a vast area to patrol in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf of 
Mexico coasts of the United States.  With few resources, they used intelligence collection 
to assist in positioning naval forces in the high threat smuggling areas.  Once a high 
threat smuggling route was identified, layered defenses were set up along the coast.24   
The general plan to suppress smuggling was for destroyers to patrol 
assigned areas at sea, making first contact with suspected rum runners.  
The destroyers would then trail the suspects, handing them off to patrol 
boats 20 to 30 nautical miles of shore.  The patrol boats would be 
responsible for trailing the suspect vessels until they either entered the 12-
mile limit and could be stopped and searched, or turned back to sea.  
While the destroyers and patrol boats patrolled offshore, the picket boats 
would patrol the shoreline to discourage the landing of alcohol on the 
beach.25 
With more than 60,000 square miles of territorial water to patrol, it would have 
been nearly impossible for the Coast Guard to implement a strict blockade with its 
relatively small naval force.  They did, however, greatly reduce the amount of liquor 
smuggled into the United States by sea and reduced the profitability of rum runners.26  
The lessons learned from this era inevitably assisted the Coast Guard and Navy in its 
current efforts to limit the amount of illicit narcotics from entering the United States.   
D. CONCLUSION 
Without question, the United States Navy is the most capable conventional navy 
in the world.  With our Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships and forward bases, we are 
capable of projecting power through our warship fleet to every corner of the world.  
However, some of our capabilities for fighting insurgencies in a maritime environment 
have atrophied.  Marines have been occupied with the land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
resulting in only a small percentage being familiar with amphibious or riverine 
operations.  Naval Special Warfare units have also placed many maritime missions on the 
                                                 
23 Malcolm Francis Willoughby, Rum War at Sea (Washington: U.S. GPO, 1964), 161. 
24 Ensign, Swenson and Kramerk, Intelligence in the Rum War at Sea, 1920-1933, 92. 
25 Ibid., 15. 
26 Willoughby, Rum War at Sea, 164. 
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back-burner due to the current ground wars.  In addition, Navy Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal units have been so consumed with the counter-IED campaigns in Iraq and 
Afghanistan that the underwater mine-countermeasures mission and other maritime 
missions have fallen by the wayside.  History has shown the importance of maritime 
interdiction in counterinsurgency operations, and insurgencies currently taking place 
throughout the world demonstrate the relevance of maritime dominance.  A force capable 
of conducting interdiction operations in the rivers, littorals, and seas is a critical piece in 
obtaining maritime dominance.   
Sri Lanka’s civil war provides a unique perspective on counterinsurgency 
strategies.  Through decades of trial and error, Sri Lanka’s final campaign to defeat the 
LTTE took less than three years.  Military victory came in the wake of failed attempts at 
diplomatic and internal negotiations, and of India’s failed intervention.  In the end, it took 
traditional military offensive operations to defeat the LTTE.  Once this extremist element 
of the Tamil population was removed, conflict resolution was able to progress by 
addressing the root causes of the conflict.  Several elements were core to the defeat of the 
LTTE.  First, the Sri Lankan government showed the political will needed to use military 
force to defeat the LTTE.  Second, the Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) played a critical role in 
countering the LTTE’s arms smuggling, maritime terrorism, and piracy operations 
resulting in a severely weakened LTTE.  Third, the fact that terrorism was perceived as 
an international threat following 9/11 allowed Sri Lanka to handle its domestic 
“terrorism” problems without direct outside intervention.  Finally, the Sri Lankan Army 
(SLA) employed an effective military offensive to destroy the insurgent forces.  Sri 
Lanka’s successful counterinsurgency reinforces the importance of prioritizing logistics 
and stands as a test case to calibrate U.S. assistance in future counterinsurgencies, 
especially those involving a large maritime domain.  The following chapters will analyze 
Sri Lanka’s conflict from its roots to the defeat of the LTTE in May 2009. 
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II. SRI LANKA’S PATH TO VIOLENT CONFLICT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Sri Lanka’s “Black July” violence in 1983 marked the beginning of its twenty-six-
year civil war.  A relatively minor attack by one of the many Tamil militant groups at the 
time, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), left thirteen Sri Lankan soldiers 
dead.  Retaliatory violence by the island’s Sinhalese majority produced island-wide anti-
Tamil riots in which thousands of Tamils were killed, maimed, and robbed.  Hundreds of 
thousands more were made homeless as their homes and businesses were burned and 
looted.27  Government complicity, or at least failure to promptly intervene, put Sri Lanka 
on a path to civil war.28   
In the years that followed, several hundred thousand Tamils fled Sri Lanka to 
escape the violence and oppression.  The more privileged Tamils fled Sri Lanka for 
Western countries, such as Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, France, 
and Australia.  This group of diaspora later became critical in funding the Tamil 
secessionist cause.  Less fortunate Sri Lankan Tamils fled to refugee camps in Tamil 
Nadu, India, and became vital contributors to the LTTE’s arms smuggling network.29  By 
war’s end in May 2009, between 80,000 to 100,000 people had died as a result of the 
ethnic violence.30  This chapter will analyze the history of Sri Lanka from its pre-colonial 
roots to the “Black July” riots of 1983 to determine how the Sinhalese and Tamils of Sri 
Lanka devolved from peaceful cohabitation to violent ethnic conflict. 
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B. GEOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND 
 
Figure 1.   Ethnic Communities in Sri Lanka (1976)31 
Twenty-six miles off India’s southern coast, Sri Lanka is a teardrop-shaped island 
approximately the size of Ireland or West Virginia with a population of more than twenty 
million.32  It is comprised of a multiethnic society with two primary linguistic divisions: 
Sinhala and Tamil (see Figure 1).  Sinhalese, the island’s majority population (74 
percent), are mainly Buddhists.33  The minority Tamil speakers do not make up a single 
bloc but are made up of the Sri Lankan Tamils, Indian Tamils, and Moors.  The Sri 
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Lankan Tamils (12.6 percent of the population) and Indian Tamils (5.5 percent of the 
population) are mainly Hindu.  The Moors (7.4 percent of the population) are Muslims 
who primarily speak Tamil but also have a significant bilingual population.  Christians 
are found on both sides of the linguistic divide and make up about 7 percent of the 
population.34  Other significant minorities include Burghers, from Dutch and Portuguese 
decent, and Malays.    
For much of Sri Lanka’s history, in particular during the civil war period from 
1983 to 2009, the island was physically divided on ethnic lines between the Sinhalese, 
principally living in the island’s central and southern regions, and the Sri Lankan Tamils 
occupying the northern and eastern regions.  Moors and Indian Tamils considered their 
ethnic identities distinct from that of the Sri Lankan Tamils.  Moors had communities 
throughout Sri Lanka with a large concentration in the east.  Indian Tamils were 
concentrated in the plantation areas in the center of the island.35  In contemporary history, 
the country’s multiethnic capital, Colombo, was the main exception to the geographic 
division between the Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Tamils, although anti-Tamil riots forced 
many Tamils out of Colombo and even out of Sri Lanka altogether.   
C. HISTORY 
Sri Lanka’s early history is documented in the Buddhist chronicle, the 
Mahavamsa.  Sinhalese Buddhists in Sri Lanka’s post-1948 independence period used the 
history to declare their claim as the legitimate inhabitants of the island.  Following 
immigrations of the Indo-Aryan tribes (the origins of Sinhalese) from northern India, 
Sinhalese kingdoms were established and consolidated by the first century BC.36  The 
chronicles also document successive invasions and incursions from the Tamils of 
southern India.37  Sri Lanka’s most significant invasion took place during the tenth 
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century when the Chola Empire from India took control of most of the island.38  The 
attacks forced the Sinhalese people and their kings to retreat into the hills and wetlands in 
search of security.39  Tamils, both settlers and members of the invading Indian armies, 
took advantage of this opportunity by occupying the north and east of Sri Lanka.  By the 
thirteen century, a Tamil kingdom was established with Jaffna at its heart.40  Political 
elites during post-independence used the history of invading Tamils from southern India 
to create a fear of Sri Lankan Tamils, thus creating ethno-linguistic divisions in modern 
society.   
Beginning in the sixteenth century, the island went through three successive 
periods of colonialism.  The Portuguese colonized Sri Lanka in 1505 with a primary 
interest in controlling the island’s commerce.  They used indirect rule to manage the 
coastal regions.  Much of the island remained in control of local kingdoms.41  The Dutch 
expelled the Portuguese from Sri Lanka in the seventeenth century.42  Again, most of the 
island remained independent of colonial rule; however, the Dutch imposed a trade 
monopoly on the entire island, which limited the ability of Sri Lankan rulers to trade with 
southern India.43  By 1796, the maritime regions of Sri Lanka changed hands once more 
as the British East India Company (EIC) wrestled control of the island from the Dutch.44  
The British Crown declared Sri Lanka a colony in 1802 and assumed control of the 
maritime regions from the EIC.45  Sri Lanka’s inland areas, however, remained in the 
hands of the Kandyan kingdom.  It was not until 1815 that the British saw their 
opportunity to defeat the last remaining kingdom in Sri Lanka.  The defeat of the 
Kandyan kingdom put the entire island under the sole control of the British.46 
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From this period, the British had a transforming affect on Sri Lanka’s social and 
economic organization.  Christian missionary organizations were encouraged to 
proselytize by the Colonial Office.  Their aim was to convert and educate the island’s 
elite population in English.  The hope was that Christianity would filter down to the rest 
of the population.  Reforms were also introduced to abolish the caste system during this 
period.47  Additionally, the British organized the construction of a network of roads and a 
railway on the island for the primary purpose of administrative, security and political 
functions, but they also served an economic purpose.48   
The country’s economy improved significantly following a rapid rise in the 
demand for coffee in Britain and Western Europe in the 1840s.  By 1846, there were 
more than 500 coffee plantations in Sri Lanka, mostly in the central Kandyan 
provinces.49  The local Kandyan population refused to work on the plantations, so British 
planters became dependant on Indian immigrants for their labor force.50  The migrants 
were largely a transient population that returned to India following coffee-picking 
season.51  After the decline of the coffee industry in Sri Lanka, tea, rubber, and coconut 
emerged as the major plantation crops.52  The tea industry was labor-intensive work that 
required year-around labor and resulted in a large permanent Indian labor-force taking 
root in the central highlands at the end of the nineteenth century.53  Indian Tamil 
immigrants, numbering 900,000 by the mid-twentieth century, became contentious during 
the post-independence era as society divided along ethno-linguistic lines, and they were 
increasingly seen as an imperial vestige with no indigenous roots.   
The last quarter of the nineteenth century yielded further changes to the social 
order through religion and education.  Marginalization of majority communities was a 
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typical tactic in Britain’s divide-and-rule policies.  “Under British colonial domination, 
non-Buddhists and ethnic minorities became disproportionately over-represented in the 
bureaucracy, civil service, and primary and secondary educational institutions.”54  In 
addition, education in English provided Sri Lankans a path to service in the colonial 
bureaucracy.55  English education, however, was almost exclusively associated with 
Christian missions.56  Rejection of these missionary efforts by much of the Sinhalese 
Buddhist population resulted in scant English educational opportunities in their 
communities.57  The Tamil elite, on the other hand, had been eager consumers of 
education, even though they largely passed on the Christianity.58  As a result, literacy in 
English was higher in Jaffna than any other area of Sri Lanka.59  Tamils leveraged the 
knowledge and linguistic skills to attain professional and civil service employment and 
generally advance their social status.60  Many educated Tamils emigrated from Jaffna to 
Colombo for employment.61  This disproportionate representation in the professions, the 
civil service, and in educational institutions later caused the Sinhalese majority to enact 
discriminatory policies. 
D. POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE 
The Ceylon Legislative Council formed in 1833 to advise the Colonial Office on 
conditions within the colony.62  The colonial governor appointed three non-British 
unofficial representatives to the Legislative Council—one Low-Country Sinhala, one 
Burgher, and one Tamil.63  In 1889, the Kandyan and Moor communities were added as 
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representatives to the Legislative Council.  The system evolved further into an electoral 
process with territorial representation by 1923.  “Out of 37 unofficial members, 23 were 
to be elected to represent territorial constituencies, while 11 would be elected to represent 
specifically created communal electorates.”64  The remaining three were nominated.  As 
the power of the Council increased and self-rule became an issue in Sri Lanka, minorities 
continued to lobby for a consociational system and later a federal governmental 
structure.65   
General cooperation between the Sinhalese and Tamils characterized Ceylon’s 
elite politics in the first two decades of the twentieth century.66  Elite competition had 
more to do with caste rivalry among the Sinhalese than between the majority and 
minority groups.67  This fundamentally changed after 1921, when Sri Lanka began to 
agitate for independence from Britain, and Tamils were viewed as a minority community, 
which resulted in ethnicity becoming a decisive factor in the competition for political and 
economic power.68  An additional division emerged between the Kandyan and the low-
country Sinhalese based on competition for resources and education.69  For this reason, 
ethnicity became a source of tension to be manipulated by political elites.   
In early 1927, the Donoughmore Commission was appointed to review the 
constitution of the colony of Sri Lanka.70  Contrary to the expectations of the Ceylon 
National Congress (a Sinhalese political association), the commission did not recommend 
Sri Lanka be given the responsibility of self-governance but instead called for a semi-
responsible local State Council answerable to a powerful colonial governor.71  
Additionally, the commission recommended a widening of the franchise from a small 
percentage of the elite community to include all males and females over the age of 
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twenty-one.72  Equally important, all provisions for communal representation were 
dropped.  Minorities feared that universal suffrage and lack of communal representation 
would result in domination of the electorate by the Sinhalese and no protections of 
minority rights.73  By adopting a structure that allowed for majority domination with little 
or no protection for minorities, ethnic tensions became a staple of Sri Lankan politics.74  
Despite the many concerns, the constitutional reforms outlined in the Donoughmore 
Commission were implemented in 1931 with the expectation that full self-governance 
would soon follow.75  Universal suffrage provided the means for elites to promote an 
exclusive form of Sinhalese nationalism.  In the following decades, the decisive nature of 
this system became evident as political elites used ethnicity to consolidate their power.   
The Second World War delayed constitutional reforms for self-governance.  It 
was not until 1945 that Sri Lankan politicians continued their campaign to lobby Britain 
for reforms.76  The British government yielded to their requests on 18 June 1947 by 
announcing that Sri Lanka would receive “fully responsible status within the British 
Commonwealth of Nations” in February 1948.77  The new constitution, based on 
recommendations from the Soulbury Commission, provided Sri Lanka with full 
sovereignty in matters of internal affairs but obligated Britain to handle external affairs 
and defense.78  It was not until 1957, when Britain’s decline was evident, that military 
and naval bases transferred to Sri Lanka.79 
The new constitution also included provisions preventing discriminatory 
legislation against minorities.80  However, the provisions did not apply to Indian Tamils 
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who were considered an “unassimilated group without roots in society.”81  The 
Citizenship Act of 1948, the Indian and Pakistani Act of 1949, and the Parliamentary 
Elections Act of 1949 deprived Indian Tamils of their citizenship rights and franchise in 
Sri Lanka.  If Indian Tamils had been granted citizenship and the franchise, then they 
would have become the dominant group in the central highlands, thereby limiting the 
influence of Kandyan Sinhalese.82  Instead, the Indian Tamils lost seven seats in the 
legislature.83  The Indian Tamils’ fate was finalized in a 1964 agreement with India that 
allowed the “repatriation over a fifteen-year period of 525,000 Indian residents in Sri 
Lanka to India, along with their natural increase, and the absorption of 300,000 as 
citizens of Sri Lanka.”84  The remaining population of 150,000 Indian Tamils’ future 
remained in limbo.   
E. FROM POLITICS TO CIVIL WAR 
The Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) was formed in 1951, when S.W.R.D. 
Bandaranaike broke away from the ruling United National Party (UNP).85  The SLFP 
was sympathetic to the religious, linguistic, and cultural issues raised by an emergent 
group of Buddhist activists.  The Sinhala-educated intelligentsia was upset by the 
opportunities that were closed to them by the English-language dominance in government 
administration.86  They felt that Tamils had a disproportionate share of professional and 
civil service employment along with better educational opportunities.87  The Buddhists 
also believed that their religion and culture were not elevated to the proper position 
within Sri Lanka.88   
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The SLFP took the opportunity to rally Buddhist nationalism around the 2500th 
anniversary of the parinibbana (death) of the Buddha in 1956.  This year also coincided 
with the general elections on the island.  The movement used language (Sinhala) as the 
basis to stir nationalism, since Buddhism and Sinhala were so deeply intertwined.89  The 
ethnic mobilization that resulted came not only from the bhikkus (Buddhist monks) but 
also from Sinhalese of all classes of society.90  It evoked a profound response in the 
Sinhalese working class, peasantry, and Sinhalese elite alike.91  As Sinhalese political 
groups began to compete for votes, they tried to outbid each other to the detriment of the 
Sri Lankan Tamils.92  The elites appealed to ethno-linguistic policies that would elevate 
Sinhalese socioeconomic status while depriving and marginalizing Tamils.93  The tables 
swiftly turned on the Sinhalese elite as various Buddhist groups began dominating the 
political agenda.  “Buddhist fronts and societies of various types were activated and 
mobilized on short notice to obstruct any Sinhala government preparing to make 
concessions to the Tamils.”94  Sinhalese nationalist pressure undermined accommodation 
of minority concerns. 
A coalition of the SLFP and two smaller Sinhalese parties successfully defeated 
the UNP in the 1956 elections, marking the country’s first transfer of power since 
independence in 1948.  The SLFP would dominate politics over the next two decades.  
The 1956 elections marked the end of multiethnic politics in Sri Lanka and the beginning 
of a more democratic and populist form of government centered on linguistic 
nationalism.  “In Sinhala, the words for nation, race and people are practically 
synonymous and a multiracial or multi-communal nation or state is incomprehensible to 
the popular mind.”95  In response, Tamil minorities began to agitate at the exclusive 
national claims of the Sinhalese.  The Federal Party (a Tamil political association) 
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asserted, “the Tamil-speaking people in Ceylon constituted a nation distinct from that of 
the Sinhalese by every fundamental test of nationhood, and in particular stressed the 
separate historical past of the Tamils and their linguistic unity and distinctiveness.”96  
The 1956 general elections proved to be the beginning of a series of events and policies 
that divide the country on an ethno-linguistic basis.   
Soon after taking office, the SLFP coalition government under Prime Minister 
Bandaranaike pushed through the Sinhala Only Act of 1956.  The act established Sinhala 
as the only official language of the island.97  During the same period, the Tamil Federal 
Party, recognizing the dwindling position of Tamils in Sri Lankan society, began to vie 
for recognition of Tamil as an official language and more autonomy in the Northern and 
Eastern provinces under a federal constitution.  With their declining influence, Tamils 
had little success other than a compromise reached in 1958 allowing Tamil to be used for 
administrative purposes in the Northern and Eastern provinces.98   
The language legislation had a dramatic effect on Tamil employment.  By 
replacing English with Sinhala as the official language, employment and education 
opportunities opened for millions of Sinhalese while at the same time excluding Tamils.99  
“From 1956 to 1970, the proportions of Tamils employed by the state fell from 60 to 10 
percent in the professions, from 30 to 5 percent in the administrative services, from 50 to 
5 percent in the clerical service, and from 40 to 1 percent in the armed forces.”100  
Sinhalese linguistic nationalism bridged class divisions and dampened intra-Sinhalese 
divisions producing a profound unity among the diverse Sinhalese population, while 
suppressing and alienating Tamils.101  
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An SLFP coalition again won the 1970 general elections with a large 
parliamentary majority that gave the government substantial power.  Their power, 
however, could not quell the discontent youth of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP).  
In 1971, this Marxist-nationalist group staged a violent insurrection against the 
government.  The rebellion was short-lived, but it had a dramatic effect in the coming 
years and provided a basis to change the country’s political structure.  A new constitution 
approved in May 1972 provided more control to the central government.  The new 
structure consisted of a unicameral republican system with the National State Assembly 
as the main instrument of power.  A strong executive was established with few checks on 
his powers.  These changes were meant to strengthen the executive to deal with 
insurgencies; however, they also limited the freedom of the press and political 
opposition.102 
The 1972 constitution also instilled further divisions between the Sinhalese and 
the minorities.  First, the constitution professed “the Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to 
Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of the state to protect 
and foster Buddhism.”103  Moreover, Sinhala was reiterated as the official state language.  
To make matters worse, the government introduced legislation in 1970 that made 
university admission less dependent on academic ability and more dependent on ensuring 
Sinhalese had their proportion of higher education.104  As a result, Tamil students had to 
far exceed their Sinhalese counterparts in university entrance examinations for degrees in 
medicine, engineering, and sciences.105  Consequently, high unemployment (43 percent) 
among the Tamil youth by the mid-1970s paved the way for a militant youth 
movement.106   
For the first time in the country’s history, these discriminatory policies had the 
effect of uniting the Tamil speaking population of Sri Lanka.  Tamil political parties 
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represented by the Federal Party, the Tamil Congress, the Ceylon Workers’ Congress 
(representing Indian Tamils), and other Tamil politicians all united under the Tamil 
United Liberation Front (TULF) in 1976.107  The systematic alienation of Tamil 
minorities by the Sinhalese was the central factor in the creation of a defensive Tamil 
nationalism.  The security dilemma produced by Sinhalese shaped the environment in 
which Tamils, under the TULF, would vie for a separate state in the Tamil homeland 
(Eelam) of the Northern and Eastern provinces.   
Although the constitution was revised again in 1977 after the UNP returned to 
power, the concessions made to minorities came too late, following decades of 
discriminatory policies.  TULF mobilization of the radicalized youth only briefly 
preceded the death of the top three Tamil political leaders in 1977.108  The secessionist 
movement quickly took on a life of its own.  By the early 1980s, the youth groups 
became powerful but fractionalized organizations that saw violence as their means of 
attaining a separate Tamil state.109  Roles quickly reversed as militant youth groups 
began to control the agenda of TULF politicians.110  They regarded the political history 
of continued deprivation of Tamil rights as a failed path and the only way forward 
required the fight for a sovereign Tamil Eelam.111   
Deteriorating relations between Sinhalese and Tamils continued as violent anti-
Tamil riots took place in 1977 and 1981 with the apparent support of the government.112  
The violence in 1981 during District Development Council elections in Jaffna led to the 
destruction of the Jaffna Municipal Library.  Tamils believed that the act was an attempt 
by the Sinhalese to destroy Tamil culture—nearly 100,000 ancient and rare documents 
had been contained in the library.113  Several Tamil militant groups appeared during this 
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period, including the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Eelam People’s 
Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization 
(TELO), the People’s Liberation Organization for Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), and the Eelam 
Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS).114  The militants were responsible for 
the assassination of politicians, soldiers, and police along with bank robberies and attacks 
on government facilities.115  From this point, events dramatically escalated from low-
level violence and criminal activity to a full-scale civil war in July 1983.   
In the months leading up to July 1983, there were a series of confrontations 
between Tamil militant groups and Sri Lankan forces.  Then, on July 23, a truck carrying 
thirteen Sri Lankan Army soldiers, all Sinhalese, were killed as they hit a landmine in 
Jaffna.  As crowds grew in Colombo, while awaiting the arrival of the bodies for a burial 
ceremony, Sinhalese politicians agitated the procession into an angry mob.  Anti-Tamil 
rhetoric and pro-Sinhalese chauvinism increasingly grew out of control of the political 
elite.  That evening it was announced that the funeral was cancelled and the bodies were 
to be sent directly to their home villages.116  The crowd quickly turned from ceremonial 
grievance to violent revenge against Tamils.  The next four days produced the worst anti-
Tamil violence in the island’s history.  The events became known as “Black July.”  
The violence had a devastating effect on the Tamil population; between 2,000 to 
3,000 Tamils were killed, arson and looting of Tamil property in Colombo produced an 
estimated $300 million in damage, and 70 percent of Tamils in Colombo were forced into 
refugee camps.117  In Colombo, 100,000 Tamils were homeless and in the rest of the 
country another 175,000 were forced from their homes.118  The more privileged Tamils 
fled Sri Lanka for Western countries, Southeast Asia and Australia.  Tens of thousands 
more fled across the Palk Strait to India.119   
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The “Black July” riots mark the beginning of the Sri Lankan civil war between 
the Sinhalese and Tamils.  The government response to the riots was non-existent, if not 
contributory.  It took the government “twenty-four hours to declare a curfew, three days 
to ensure the curfew was effective, and four days” for the president to address the 
nation.120  When Jayewardene did address the nation, he demanded “national respect of 
the Sinhalese people” and failed to mention the murder of thousands of Tamils or the fact 
that most of Colombo’s Tamils were in refugee camps.121  The weak state response to the 
riots provided the trigger that launched Sri Lanka into a violent conflict that would last 
nearly twenty-six years.  
F. CONCLUSION 
A series of factors explain the underlying causes of violent ethnic conflict in Sri 
Lanka.  First, British colonialism united the entire island under a single administration.  
Roads and railways were constructed on the island, which linked people that previously 
had rare occasion to encounter each other.  Increased communication of diverse groups 
with different languages, religions, and cultures inherently increased the chance for 
conflict.122  Additionally, colonial legacy was seen as critical in the “elevation of outsider 
minorities to a disproportionately large presence in the economy, the bureaucracy, and 
other positions of power and prestige.”123  Britain’s divide-and-rule policies placed 
Tamils in a “minority management” position.  With disproportionate employment and 
educational opportunities, the Sinhalese majority was set on regaining dominate influence 
upon independence.  In addition, Buddhist outrage over the historical injustices suffered 
by their religion while under colonial rule provided a sense of unity among various 
groups of Sinhalese.124   
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Elites used Sinhalese history, as described in the Mahavamsa, to “fashion a 
national ideology that promoted the belief that Sri Lanka was Sihidipa (the island of the 
Sinhalese) and Dhammadipa (the island chosen to preserve and propagate 
Buddhism).”125  Sri Lanka was seen as the only home of Sinhalese left in the world, 
whereas Tamils could always go to Tamil Nadu in India.126  Universal suffrage provided 
the Sinhalese majority an opportunity to dominate the political environment.  The 
temptation to mobilize a large majority of the population along ethno-linguistic divisions 
was too alluring for political elite to resist.127  Consequently, divisions began to take root 
in the society and later became salient when language developed into the basis for 
nationalism and ethnic mobilization. 
Sinhalese elite also began alienating the Tamil community by creating the 
perception of a security dilemma based on ethno-linguistic divisions.128  Even though 
Sinhalese constituted a near three-quarter majority on the island, their ethno-linguistic 
association of the fifty-five million Tamils in India with the less than four million in Sri 
Lanka created a threat that could be manipulated.129  They used the island’s pre-colonial 
history, as documented in the Mahavamsa, to create a fear of invading Tamils from 
India.130  By associating that fear with Sri Lankan Tamils, Sinhalese elite effectively 
created a minority complex for their majority community. 
Defensive Tamil nationalism resulted from a reluctant transition from politics to a 
separatist movement.  The Sinhalese sought to transform Sri Lanka into a Sinhalese state 
by either assimilating Tamils or forcing them to leave for India, which many did after 
1948 Independence was followed by a dismantling of Tamil rights.  Discriminatory 
language policies generated high unemployment and few educational opportunities, 
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combined with state-sponsorship of Buddhism, produced a unitary state that largely 
excluded Sri Lankan Tamils.131  To make matters worse, peaceful demonstrations by 
Tamils to discriminatory legislation resulted in anti-Tamil riots in 1956, 1958, 1977, 
1981, and the worst of all in 1983.132  Escalating discrimination and violence against 
Tamils produced a security dilemma133 uniting Tamils under a secessionist agenda 
claiming a traditional Tamil homeland in the Northern and Eastern provinces.134  As 
Tamil political leadership began to die-off, particularly in 1977, the radical unemployed 
youth began to lead the Tamil separatist cause in a more militant direction.  The 
institutional failure of the state to respond to the events of “Black July” proved to be the 
tipping point that thrust the country into all-out civil war.135 
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III. OSCILLATING BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The decades that follow the 1983 riots oscillate between war and peace with 
domestic and international attempts to resolve the violent conflict.  The Indo-Sri Lankan 
Accord, signed in 1987, provided the framework for direct Indian intervention with an 
Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF).  After thirty-two months attempting to restore peace 
in Sri Lanka, India withdrew its last soldiers in March 1990.  The election of Sri Lankan 
President Chandrika Kumaratunga in 1994 led to a domestic peace initiative.  In less than 
a year, negotiations between the GoSL and LTTE broke down and the country resumed 
its war.  In 2002, a Norwegian-brokered ceasefire agreement was signed by the GoSL and 
LTTE.  Relative peace lasted in Sri Lanka for more than four years.  Yet in mid-2006, the 
country again slipped back into violent conflict.  This chapter will illustrate how both the 
GoSL and the Tamil militants used the breaks in fighting to regroup and rearm, inevitably 
extending the conflict.   
B. EELAM I: THE BEGINNING OF THE CIVIL WAR 
The institutional failure of the state to respond to the events of “Black July” 
proved to be the tipping point that thrust the country into all-out civil war.136  India saw 
the violent riots as an opportunity to intervene in Sri Lankan affairs.137  There was broad 
outrage over the ethnic violence against Tamils, particularly among the Tamils in India.  
There were also refugees streaming across the Palk Strait into India in the tens of 
thousands.  Upper-class Tamils were not exempt from the violent discrimination in Sri 
Lanka.138  They were able to garner wide international political support and attention for 
their cause.  Western countries were reluctant to get involved however; instead, they 
looked to India as a regional power to settle the matter.  India’s intervention took two 
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paths: an overt path that mediated between the GoSL and the Tamil groups, and a covert 
path of arming and training Tamil militants through its external intelligence agency, the 
Research and Analysis Wing (RAW).139  The seemingly inconsistent paths were meant to 
strengthen India’s ability to extract concessions from the GoSL in order to negotiate a 
settlement.140   
Eelam I, as the first civil war period became known, was characterized by Tamil 
militant groups making significant gains against the Sri Lankan military.  They began 
taking control of large portions of northern and eastern Sri Lanka.  More than twenty 
organizations made up the militant movement, with membership numbering more than 
10,000 at the time, and were formed with the agenda of creating a separate Tamil state 
called Eelam.141  Many of the groups were trained and equipped in southern India (Tamil 
Nadu) by RAW.142  An estimated twelve hundred Tamil militants trained on Indian soil 
between September 1983 and July 1987.143  They were trained in the use of “automatic 
and semi-automatic weapons, self-loading rifles, 84mm rocket launchers, heavy weapons, 
and in laying mines, map reading, guerilla war, mountaineering, demolitions and anti-
tank warfare while selected cadres from some groups were given training in diving and 
underwater sabotage.”144  The advanced training, equipment, and improved tactics 
proved to be very effective against the Sri Lankan Army until infighting between 
militants groups in 1986.145   
RAW’s control of the militant groups progressively declined after 1984, 
particularly with the LTTE.  The LTTE did not want to tie its hands by depending solely 
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on India for funding, arming, and training to support its secessionist cause.146  
Additionally, the LTTE did not wish for India to have undue influence over them.  In 
February 1986, the LTTE separated itself from RAW and began eliminating rival Tamil 
militant groups.147  Hundreds of Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) members 
were killed during a one-week period in mid-1986 and by the year’s end, more than one 
hundred members of Eelam People’s Liberation Front (EPRLF) were also killed.148  
India’s support of Tamil militants backfired and would latter hinder their efforts to 
disarm and disband these groups. 
The Sri Lankan Army began the civil war poorly armed and trained.  Most came 
from peasant families and had little discipline or will to fight.149  By the end of 1985, the 
Sri Lankan military became better trained and equipped to handle the Tamil militants:   
The Sri Lankan government had gradually built up its force in 1985 by 
purchasing new helicopter gunships, light aircraft, gunboats, new armored 
personnel carriers, small arms, and artillery from Pakistan, Israel and 
South Africa.  Government forces were also trained by SAS British 
mercenaries, the Israeli Secret Service, and Pakistani military personnel in 
guerrilla tactics to fight Tamil militants and to fly helicopter gunships and 
light aircraft.150   
Following an embargo imposed on the Jaffna peninsula of fuel, food, and medical 
supplies, the Sri Lankan Army launched an offensive against the militants in January 
1987.151  By March, the militants were retreating from their camps and outposts and 
consolidating in Jaffna.152  India put considerable pressure on Sri Lanka to return to 
negotiations for a political solution.  As a result, Sri Lanka declared, what turned out to 
be, a short-lived ceasefire.  On April 17, 1987, Tamil militants gunned down 125 
Sinhalese civilians near Trincomalee followed by another hundred when a bomb 
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exploded in a Colombo bus station.  The GoSL rebuffed India’s pressure and resumed its 
military offensive on May 26 with Operation Liberation.  A series of victories put the 
momentum on the side of the Sri Lankan Army as they surrounded Jaffna.153  While the 
army was poised to take the Jaffna peninsula, India stepped in again over concerns of 
civilian Tamil casualties.  In early June, they announced their intent on delivering 
humanitarian supplies to Jaffna through the Red Cross.  On June 4, Indian fishing boats, 
under ICRC auspices, carrying the supplies were forced to return to India by the Sri 
Lankan Navy.  The next day, India air-dropped twenty-five tons of food and supplies 
over Jaffna.154  The bold move by India was effective at convincing the GoSL that Indian 
intervention was imminent.  The Sri Lankan military halted their offensive and in less 
than two months signed the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement (ISLA) of July 1987.155 
C. INDIAN INTERVENTION 
The ISLA included measures to devolve administrative power to the provinces in 
order to address Tamil grievances.  In return, Tamil militants (through separate 
negotiations with India) agreed to disarm and disband.  V. Prabhakaran, founder and 
leader of the LTTE, was personally assured by the Prime Minister of India that Tamils 
would be protected if they agreed to disarm and disband.  Within a day of the signing of 
the agreement, the India Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) deployed to Sri Lanka to oversee the 
implementation of the provisions.  Their reputation for impartiality quickly became 
tainted following revelations of abuse against the Tamil population.  The Indian Army 
was commonly cited committing human rights violations such as rape and torture.  In 
addition, soon after arriving in Sri Lanka to disarm and disband Tamil militants, the IPKF 
launched an operation to destroy the operational headquarters of the LTTE in Jaffna 
using a force of 103 paratroopers.  The operation failed miserably with the loss of more 
than sixty Indian soldiers but no losses on the Tamil militant side.  This incident proved 
to be a severe embarrassment in India.  The weak consent for Indian intervention by the 
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Tamils quickly turned to all-out disapproval.  The LTTE immediately broke with the 
provisions and temporarily turned their fight to the IPKF.  The IPKF entered Sri Lanka as 
a peacekeeping force with a limited set of responsibilities.  Within a short time, their role 
evolved to a complex counterinsurgency, due in part to their own neglect and lack of 
experience.156  
By October 1987, the IPKF was conducting operations to take the Jaffna 
peninsula by force.  Ironically, they were conducting the same operations that they were 
sent there to stop the Sri Lanka military from doing.  The operation was costly for the 
IPKF.  During the October and November assault alone, they lost 262 soldiers.  The 
LTTE disappeared into the swamps and jungles of the Vanni and began to launch a 
guerrilla war against the IPKF.  The Indian army became indiscriminate in their 
operations, resulting in high civilian casualties.157   
Although the GoSL was also discontent with the Indian intervention, they were 
able to capitalize on IPKF assistance in the north by diverting the Sri Lankan military to 
respond to a Marxist-nationalist insurgency by the Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) in the 
south.  Once the JVP insurgency was contained, the Sinhalese majority put pressure on 
Sri Lankan President to expel the IPKF.  India ignored the GoSL demands for the IPKF 
to leave.  The newly elected Sri Lankan President responded by providing arms to the 
LTTE to assist their efforts to drive out the Indian forces.  By March 1990, a humiliated 
Indian military finally conceded and left the island of Sri Lanka after losing more than 
1,100 of its soldiers.  Within hours of the IPKF leaving Sri Lanka, the LTTE was in firm 
control of the Northern and Eastern provinces after other militant groups dissolved or fled 
the island.158     
The collusion between the GoSL and the LTTE to expel the IPKF did not bring 
increased cooperation between the two foes.  Following the departure of the IPKF, the 
civil war resumed more intense than before the Indian intervention.  The LTTE emerged 
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as the dominant Tamil militant group with a significantly increased capability to conduct 
guerrilla and even conventional warfare.159  The Sri Lankan military also swelled its 
ranks and increased its capability through the purchase of military equipment from 
countries such as China and Pakistan.160  Both the GoSL and the Tamil militants (now 
consolidated under the LTTE) used the break in fighting to strengthen their position to 
wage war against the other.   
D. EELAM II: A RETURN TO WAR 
With India’s departure, the LTTE resumed its campaign of Tamil Eelam.  
Between June 1990 and the end of 1993, the LTTE consolidated its hold on the Tamil 
homeland in the north and east.  They established an arms smuggling network in 
Southeast Asia that provided them with heavy machine guns, surface-to-air missiles, 
pressure mines, naval equipment and communications.161  The extensive Tamil diaspora 
provided funding for costly military equipment.  In addition to developing the ability to 
conduct conventional operations and improving its guerrilla operations, the LTTE also 
realized the importance of a naval capability.162  They began attacking troop carriers and 
supply ships that were transiting to and from the Sri Lankan Army’s isolated bases on the 
Jaffna Peninsula.  The attacks had a debilitating impact on the Army’s ability to conduct 
operations by severing supply lines and lowering morale.  By the end of Eelam II, the 
LTTE had built its force to approximately 16,000 personnel.163  
In the early 1990s, the LTTE also conducted a series of assassinations against 
threats to the organization and those that insulted its leader.  The first on the list was Sri 
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Lanka’s defense minister, Ranajan Wejeratne.  He led the effort to defeat the JVP and 
was planning the war against the LTTE.  He was blown up in March 1991 as he was 
driving to work in his armor-plated Mercedes.164  Next, the former Prime Minister of 
India, Rajiv Gandhi, was killed by a suicide bomber as he was campaigning just outside 
of Madras.165  A month later, a bomb destroyed the Sri Lankan Army headquarters in 
Colombo, and in August 1992 most of the Army’s top leadership were killed on Kayts 
Island off the coast of Jaffna.166  In April 1993, Sri Lanka’s first National Security 
Minister, Lalith Athulathmudali, was killed by a gunman in Colombo.  He was 
responsible for the near defeat of the Tamil militants prior to Indian intervention.167  A 
week later, Sri Lanka’s President, Ranasinghe Premadasa, was killed by a suicide bomber 
while the president was attending an election rally.168  Numerous other assassinations and 
killings took place.  Although Eelam II can be characterized as a one-sided victory by the 
LTTE, their one flaw was killing the Indian Prime Minister.169  This strategic mistake 
cost the LTTE many of its tentative allies in southern India.170   
E. KUMARATUNGA’S PEACE INITIATIVE (1994–95) 
With the LTTE now challenging the Sri Lankan Army military head on, the civil 
war quickly turned into a “hurting stalemate.”  The 1994 presidential and parliamentary 
elections produced a change of power as President Chandrika Kumaratunga took control 
of the country by campaigning on a peace platform.  Upon taking office, Kumaratunga 
put together a four-person team that would negotiate directly with the LTTE.  The 
negotiations were backed up with a set of constitutional proposals meant to restore 
confidence to the minorities.  During the first round of talks, the team was received in 
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Jaffna with “flower pedals and wild popular enthusiasm.”171  As the months passed, the 
negotiations quickly broke down.  By April 1995, “the ceasefire and negotiations crashed 
when the LTTE resumed the battle by blowing up two Sri Lankan naval craft and, within 
the next five days, downing two Sri Lankan air force planes.”172  After Kumaratunga’s 
peace initiative was rejected by the LTTE, she pledged to use “any and all means” to 
bring the war to a successful conclusion.173  She put forth a massive increase in defense 
spending that facilitated the purchase of weapons and equipment from China, Russia, and 
Israel.174  With the increased military capability, the Sri Lankan Army was again ready to 
engage the LTTE.  Over the next five years a “war for peace” strategy was adopted in 
which constitutional devolution of power was accompanied by an aggressive military 
offensive against the LTTE in order to force them to negotiate after the war was won.175   
F. EELAM III: A WAR FOR PEACE 
The Sri Lankan Army launched Operation Riviresa in October 1995.  It took only 
forty-eight days for the major military offensive to successfully bring Jaffna back under 
government control for the first time in ten years.176  Successive iterations of Operation 
Riviresa resulted in the entire Jaffna Peninsula reverting to government control by mid-
1996.177  The LTTE essentially disappeared before the army arrived, leaving only the 
sick and elderly behind.  As the army turned its attention to the LTTE strongholds in the 
eastern province, the LTTE again faded into the jungles and swamps.178   
The LTTE continued its campaign of assassinations and bombings while planning 
a major operation against Sri Lankan Army forces in the northern and eastern provinces.  
They began by launching an attack on an army base in Mullaitivu, “killing an estimated 
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1,200 soldiers and capturing large amounts of defense hardware, including armored 
personnel carriers, four 120mm artillery pieces, and night-vision and surveillance 
equipment only recently acquired from abroad.”179  Now, as the LTTE regrouped and 
acquired a significant cache of weapons and equipment, the initiative began to alternate 
between the two foes.  The Sri Lankan Army still had not attained secure lines of 
communication between Colombo and Jaffna.  They remained dependent on the Sri 
Lankan Navy to transport troops and supplies.  By November 1999, the LTTE controlled 
most of the Vanni (the area south of Jaffna) and by April 2000, it controlled the 
strategically important Elephant Pass (one of only two land routes into the Jaffna 
Peninsula).180  The Sri Lankan Army was left isolated, with limited control of High 
Security Zones in Jaffna.  A December 1999 assassination attempt of President 
Kumaratunga left her blind in one eye and badly wounded.  As the costs of war escalated 
on both sides, neither able to decisively defeat the other, the conflict again fell into a 
“hurting stalemate.”  In late 2001, the LTTE announced a ceasefire that culminated in a 
Norwegian-brokered ceasefire agreement between the LTTE and the GoSL in February 
2002.181 
G. NORWAY STEPS IN: THE 2002 CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT 
The ceasefire agreement between the GoSL and the LTTE included provisions for 
an international monitoring mission led by Norway.182  The Sri Lankan Monitoring 
Mission (SLMM), as it became known, was created to conduct on-site monitoring to 
ensure the commitments made in the ceasefire agreement were abided by.183  
Additionally, Norway assumed the responsibility as facilitator of the peace talks.  Each 
role required neutrality to be maintained yet both the SLMM and the Norwegian 
facilitators were criticized for their impartiality.  President Kumaratunga felt that the 
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monitoring mission compromised Sri Lanka’s sovereignty.  Sinhalese nationalists saw 
Norwegian involvement as a “continuation of imperialist designs.”184  The president 
called for the replacement of the chief of the SLMM at the end of 2003 after allegations 
that he leaked national security information about an LTTE smuggling vessel.  Human 
rights groups also criticized Norway’s impartiality.  They claimed that the LTTE were 
recruiting child soldiers and attacking opposition Tamil organizations as Norway was 
looking the other way.185  Norway progressively became less effective at facilitating 
peace talks and their remaining role as monitors had no enforcement power.   
From February 2002 to April 2003, the LTTE and GoSL held six rounds of face-
to-face Norway-facilitated peace negotiations.  Both sides quickly became frustrated with 
the process as each was reluctant to make concessions.  President Kumaratunga felt that 
the ceasefire and peace talks provided the LTTE an opportunity to set up a “de facto 
independent state in the northeastern province of Sri Lanka.”186  The LTTE became upset 
as the GoSL refused to pull the Sri Lankan Army from the High Security Zones in 
Jaffna.187  Frustrated, the LTTE hastily walked out of the peace talks in April 2003.  By 
the end of the year, there were serious doubts about the continued viability of the peace 
process.   
It became clear that there was little faith in the peace negotiations by either side.  
The LTTE continued to rebuild its military and regularly violated the ceasefire 
agreement.  They grew their ranks from 6,000 to 16,000 during the peace talks.  The Sri 





                                                 
184 Moolakkattu, Peace Facilitation by Small States: Norway in Sri Lanka, 394. 
185 Ibid., 395. 
186 Rajat Ganguly, “Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict: At a Crossroad between Peace and War,” Third 
World Quarterly 25, no. 5 (2004), 903–917, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993700. 911, (accessed 
2/20/2009). 
187 Ibid., 911. 
 37
modernization of the armed forces” was underway with the support of India and 
others.188  The break in fighting appears to have only provided an opportunity for both 
sides to regroup and rearm.   
September 2003 saw the inauguration of the Tamil Eelam Police headquarters in 
Kilinochchi by the LTTE Chief Prabhakaran.  This was a clear indication that the LTTE 
was setting up institutions for a separate state.  President Kumaratunga had severe 
reservations on concessions made to the LTTE by the rival United National Front (UNF) 
under Prime Minister Wickremesinghe.  In November 2003, the President declared a state 
of emergency in the country “under which she suspended parliament and took control of 
the ministries of Defence, Interior and Media from the government.”189  Then, in 
February 2004, she dissolved parliament and set new elections for April as she formed a 
new alliance between her party (the Sri Lankan Freedom Party) and a left-wing Marxist-
nationalist party, the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP).  The SLFP-JVP alliance 
combined to form the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA).  The UPFA came out 
ahead in the April elections with Mahinda Rajapakse leading the new parliament.190  Just 
as the ruling government turned away from peace negotiations with the LTTE toward 
hard-line policies, cracks start to emerge in the LTTE organization. 
The LTTE’s eastern commander, Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan or “Colonel 
Karuna,” along with 6,000 of his fighters split from the LTTE in March 2004.191  Colonel 
Karuna later explained his reason for defecting: 
My problem with Prabhakaran was mainly because of his rigid attitude.  
For two years since 2002 after LTTE acceded to the Norway-brokered 
Ceasefire, I was in the delegation that held negotiations all over the globe.  
During our interaction and travels, we had realized that the world was no 
longer tolerant of violence, even if it was for a good cause. 
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In 2004, after I returned from Geneva, I went up to Prabhakaran and 
showed him a draft agreement proposed by the negotiators.  One glance at 
it and he tore the draft and threw it in my face accusing me of betraying 
the Tamil cause.192 
It quickly became apparent to Colonel Karuna that Prabhakaran never intended to 
negotiate a peaceful settlement with the GoSL.  Karuna’s faction negotiated a separate 
truce with the government and fought in cooperation with the Sri Lankan Army in 
addition to providing important strategic and tactical intelligence.193  In addition to 
weakening the LTTE militarily, this proved to be critical blow to the LTTE’s claim to be 
the only voice of the Tamils. 
December 2004 added to the LTTE’s downward spiral.  A tsunami devastated the 
east coast of Sri Lanka, causing 35,000 deaths, destroying 100,000 homes and displacing 
600,000 people.  At least 1,000 members of the LTTE died, and many of the Sea Tiger’s 
naval craft were destroyed.194  A brief period of cooperation between the LTTE and the 
GoSL quickly turned sour as fighting over the handling and disposition of humanitarian 
relief ensued.195  Throughout 2005, the LTTE was actively fundraising for the “Final 
War.”  Then, in August 2005, the LTTE resumed its campaign of assassinations.196   
Presidential elections in November 2005 resulted in a victory for SLFP candidate 
Mahinda Rajapakse for a six-year term.  His opponent, former Prime Minister 
Wickremasinghe, narrowly lost the election, due in part to an LTTE-engineered boycott 
of the election by the Tamil community.197  Wickremasinghe was much more committed 
to the peace process and negotiating with the LTTE.  Rajapakse, on the other hand, took a 
hard-line approach to the LTTE similar to his predecessor President Kumaratunga.198  
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The LTTE’s boycott effectively put an end to the peace process in Sri Lanka.199  Once 
the new leadership took its place, the peace negotiations and the ceasefire agreement 
promptly fell apart. 
As violence progressively increased on both sides, one last attempt at peace was 
made during bilateral talks in Geneva in February 2006.  A second round of scheduled 
talks never took place as violence spiraled out of control.  “During the first half of 2006 
around 1,000 lives were lost in conflict-related incidents.”200  The most significant 
incident took place on April 25, when a female suicide bomber attempted to assassinate 
the army chief of staff, Lieutenant General Fonseka.201  The Sri Lankan Air Force 
responded by launching a wave of retaliatory strikes against LTTE positions.  Clashes 
between the military and LTTE also escalated with at least 191 casualties in April 
2006.202  Although the SLMM remained in place until January 2008, it became readily 
apparent that the country slipped back into civil war.     
H. CONCLUSION 
In the case of Sri Lanka, peacekeeping operations through third-party intervention 
and domestic attempts at peace negotiation failed to contain or reduce violence and only 
extended the civil war.  Several factors contributed to the failure of India’s intervention.  
First, there was weak consent for the peace accord that quickly lost favor from both the 
GoSL and the LTTE.  Second, the IPKF was not manned, prepared, or trained to conduct 
peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations.  Their raid on the LTTE headquarters 
highlights the lack of restraint and minimum force that is fundamental to peace 
operations.  Additionally, by committing human rights violations, the IPKF lost 
credibility and impartiality, which in turn, destroyed the consent of the Tamils to the 
provisions of the peace operation.  Credibility and consent were also lost from the GoSL 
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by India’s lack of transparency.  India presented itself as a mediator through the Indo-Sri 
Lankan Peace Accord and the IPKF while RAW secretly armed and trained Tamil 
militants.  This sent contradictory signals and presented questions about the intentions 
and legitimacy of India’s intervention.  Finally, the intervention only extended the violent 
conflict.  The GoSL was poised to defeat the Tamil extremists just prior to the 
intervention by India.  India simply bought time for both sides to regroup and rearm.  The 
LTTE’s defeat was delayed almost two decades resulting in the death of between 80,000 
to 100,000 people.203   
President Kumaratunga’s peace initiative in 1994 had even less success than 
India’s intervention.  Her proposals for constitutional devolution of power and increased 
minority rights were met with violence by the LTTE.  It became readily apparent to her 
that the only way to obtain peace in Sri Lanka was to militarily defeat the LTTE, 
followed by constitutional provisions to address Tamil grievances.  President 
Kumaratunga’s “war for peace” strategy resulted in massive government spending to 
increase the size and capability of the armed forces.  Subsequently, a series of military 
operations took place to regain control over the entire island and defeat the LTTE.  As 
territory changed hands on both sides, the fighting produced high casualties and by the 
decade’s end, the civil war was at a stalemate.   
The SLMM led by the Norwegians to monitor the 2002 ceasefire agreement also 
proved to be ineffective.  Although the ceasefire agreement and monitors created a short 
period of reduced violence, in the end there was no positive impact for a long-term 
settlement.  As seen in the previous instances, each group regrouped, rearmed, and 
resumed fighting.  In this case, however, the GoSL returned to hostilities with a few 
distinct advantages.  First, the events of September 11, 2001, created a period in which 
violence associated with terrorism garnered little support throughout the world.  This 
provided a period in which the GoSL could act with little intervention from the 
international community.  Second, the defection of Colonel Karuna and his 6,000 cadres 
from the LTTE weakened Prabakharan militarily and diminished his position as the sole 
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representative of the Tamils.  Lastly, the tsunami in December 2004 destroyed a 
significant portion of the LTTE’s military equipment in the east, in addition to killing an 
estimated 1,000 rebels.  Combined, these factors provided the GoSL an enormous 
advantage during the “final war” with the LTTE.   
In each of Sri Lanka’s attempts at peace, both the government and the rebels used 
the break in fighting to improve their fighting capability once the war resumed.  The type 
of peace operation made little difference to the outcome.  Peace enforcement, 
peacekeeping and domestic peace negotiation all produced the same result; the break in 
fighting extended the conflict by allowing each side to regroup and rearm.  The election 
of Mahinda Rajapaksa to the Presidency in November 2005 set Sri Lanka on resolute 
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IV. EELAM IV: THE FINAL WAR 
The “Final War” in Sri Lanka had several defining characteristics that set it apart 
from the previous decades of conflict.  First, a government determined to defeat the 
LTTE was elected.  Next, the international political environment had turned against 
“terrorism,” so that world and regional powers backed Sri Lanka’s campaign against the 
Tamil extremists.  Several countries also provided Sri Lanka with military assistance in 
the form of arms, ammunition, training, technology, and intelligence.  The GoSL 
leveraged this support to isolate the LTTE through the use of maritime interdiction.  By 
isolating and starving the LTTE of arms, ammunition, and logistical support, the Sri 
Lankan Army was able to launch a successful ground offensive against a weakened 
enemy.  This chapter will explain how political will, international support, and maritime 
interdiction combined to enable a successful ground offensive to defeat the LTTE. 
A. POLITICS OF WAR 
With renewed vigor and determination, the new president put the country on a 
course to end its protracted civil war through a decisive military defeat of the LTTE.  He 
began by placing key personnel, with the same agenda, in top leadership positions.  He 
asked his brother, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, to serve as Defense Secretary.  He also named 
Major General Sarath Fonseka as Army commander.204  The two new appointees were 
well acquainted.  Gotabaya Rajapaksa served twenty years in the Sri Lankan Army 
alongside Fonseka when they were both lieutenant colonels fighting the LTTE.205  By 
pairing these two like-minded leaders, the president created a team he trusted to 
coordinate a victory.  Fonseka later discussed how he transformed the Army:  
When I took over, most officers had the mentality that we cannot win this 
war, as had been the case in the past three Eelam Wars.  But my belief was 
that with the right strategy and right selection of meritorious officers at 
every level, the LTTE could be defeated.  So I personally selected capable 
Division, Task Force as well as Brigade commanders, not on seniority, but 
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based on their past capabilities in the battlefield.  I handpicked these 
officers on their merits.  I placed my confidence in them.206 
The Defense Secretary also ensured that the Navy and Air Force were prepared 
for the challenges ahead.  Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda assumed command of 
the Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) shortly before President Rajapaksa took office.  Fortunately, 
he too was a visionary leader.  He is credited with transforming the SLN into an effective 
fighting force using innovative tactics combined with increased use of intelligence and 
international cooperation.  In addition, Air Marshal Roshan Goonatilake was appointed as 
Commander of the Air Force in June 2006.  He effectively integrated new aircraft and 
technology into his force then used the new assets to execute aggressive air raids and 
perform critical casualty evacuation operations in support of ground operations.207 
Sri Lanka also undertook a period of rapid military modernization during this 
period.  By far, the largest financial contributor and arms supplier to Sri Lanka in recent 
years has been China, which has filled the gap left by India and Western countries 
concerned about the humanitarian crisis produced by fighting:    
It is only after India told us that it [would] not supply offensive weapons 
that we looked at other options,” Fonseka asserted.  “We first tried western 
countries but their weapons are expensive.  Also the Western countries 
cannot be depended upon to continue the supplies when it [comes] to the 
crunch as it happened with us in the middle of the war when certain 
countries blocked supply of spare parts for our airplanes and helicopters.  
So we turned to China which offered us arms immediately on favorable 
terms.208 
China, Pakistan, Russia, and Ukraine all provided support without the expectation 
that support was tied to increased influence in Sri Lanka.  China is building a $1 billion 
port facility on the southern coast of Sri Lanka to support Chinese naval operations, 
among other uses.  “Ever since Sri Lanka agreed to the plan, in March 2007, China 
[gave] it all the aid, arms and diplomatic support it [needed] to defeat the Tigers, without 
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worrying about the West.”209  A $37.6 million deal to buy Chinese ammunition and 
ordnance was signed in April 2007.210  China also gifted six F7 jet fighters to Sri Lanka 
in 2008.211  In addition, “since 2007 China has encouraged Pakistan to sell weapons to 
Sri Lanka and to train Sri Lankan pilots to fly the Chinese fighters.”212  Equally 
significant, China has used its diplomatic power to block efforts to put Sri Lanka on the 
United Nations Security Council’s agenda.213  China’s unquestioned support of Sri Lanka 
allowed President Rajapaksa to pursue his domestic agenda virtually unconstrained by 
outside interference.   
Nevertheless, support to Sri Lanka from India and the United States was far from 
negligible.  Indian domestic politics limited New Delhi’s ability publicly to support Sri 
Lanka’s war.  The ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA) depended on its coalition 
partner, the Dravidian Progress Federation (DMK) party in Tamil Nadu, to stay in power 
in Parliament.  The DMK and the Tamil population in the Tamil Nadu opposed the 
GoSL’s military efforts to end the conflict.214  Consequently, while India publically 
refused to provide offensive weapons to Sri Lanka, in fact, its contributions were 
significant:  a Sukanya-class Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) was given to Sri Lanka in 
2002 while in 2006, India donated five Mi-17 helicopters to Sri Lanka.  They have also 
provided fast attack craft, military radars, and logistical equipment.215  In addition to 
material support, India shared intelligence and coordinated naval patrols with the SLN in 
order to limit arms smuggling into Sri Lanka.216   
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The United States provided a command and control system that provided Naval 
Headquarters, Colombo with better situational awareness of both friendly and enemy 
forces.217  With better command and control, the capability of naval commanders to plan, 
direct, coordinate, and control forces was enhanced.  Additionally, the United States 
provided critical intelligence information to assist in the destruction of the LTTE’s 
maritime arms smuggling network.218  U.S. arms sales also contributed to Sri Lanka’s 
war effort, until March 2008, when it was suspended in response to human rights 
concerns.219  As military operations progressed, by mid-2007 President Rajapaksa came 
under intense pressure to halt the offensive.  In the short-term, his military campaign 
“cost him close allies, inflicted heavy economic damage, earned his government aid cuts, 
and provoked stinging censure from foreign governments and rights groups.”220  Despite 
the pressure, President Rajapaksa provided the necessary space that military commanders 
needed to defeat the Tamil extremists.  “All the prior military regimes had the ability to 
defeat the LTTE but this time the political will was behind the military.”221  The 
combination of competent military service commanders, a well-armed and trained force, 
backed by a resolute president and secretary of defense, provided the GoSL a critical 
edge in the final campaign.   
B. ISOLATING THE LTTE THROUGH MARITIME INTERDICTION 
From the beginning of the civil war, the coastal regions controlled by the LTTE 
proved to be a significant security challenge to the SLN.  Early in the conflict, LTTE 
maritime operations consisted of arms smuggling and human trafficking between Sri 
Lanka and Tamil Nadu.  By 1984, the LTTE realized the importance of a dedicated 
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maritime force, thereby creating the Sea Tigers.222  Drawing on the Tamil community’s 
traditional seafaring expertise, the Sea Tigers indigenously produced a variety of craft 
and developed tactics that would challenge the SLN for decades to come.223  Most of the 
craft were 6 to 10 meters in length, armed with mounted machine guns, and capable of 
speeds up to 45 knots.224  During the 1990s, the Sea Tigers infested the northern and 
eastern coasts.  Their tactics evolved to include the use of swarm tactics and suicide boat 
attacks in offensive operations against the SLN.225  In addition, the Sea Tigers deployed 
LTTE guerrillas in amphibious attacks against military bases in Pooneryn (1995), 
Mullaitivu (1996), Elephant Pass (2000), and the Jaffna Peninsula (2001).226   
Heavy commercial fishing activity along the northern coast complicated Sri 
Lanka’s attempts to counter the Sea Tigers.  An estimated one million people in Sri 
Lanka and another 800,000 from Tamil Nadu depended on the fishing industry for their 
livelihood.227  The area between the Jaffna Peninsula and Adams Bridge is not only rich 
with crab, prawn, and other marine life, but it was also a frequent route for smuggling 
operations by the LTTE.228    
The SLN did not allow fishing in this area from the Sri Lankan side but 
from the Indian side, on a single day there would be four or five thousand 
boats crossing the International Boundary Line (IBL) coming into this area 
for poaching.  They did not have fish in their area so they came into Sri 
Lankan waters.  The LTTE had the same fishing boats and used them to 
smuggle supplies across the Palk Strait.229   
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The SLN had a difficult time distinguishing legitimate fishing vessels from LTTE 
smuggling vessels.  A Sri Lankan Navy officer with extensive operational experience in 
the area described the difficulties identifying LTTE vessels: 
Their vessels are the same as the other fishing vessels.  The best way to 
distinguish them is from their manners in the water.  The LTTE boats will 
break off from the other fishing vessels.  The fishing vessels have certain 
directions that they go because they are trawling.  I could distinguish an 
LTTE vessel on the radar based on its maneuvers in the water.230 
Despite substantial effort by the SLN to counter arms smuggling across the Palk 
Strait, the Sea Tigers “evolved into a formidable naval force commanding control over 
the northeastern seas.”231 
1. Destroying the LTTE Arms Smuggling Network 
The LTTE began to break its dependence on Tamil Nadu for arms supplies in the 
mid-1990s.  “Intelligence reports of that period point to four nations from which the 
LTTE’s chief arms procurer, Kumaran Pathmanathan, got weapons: Burma, Cambodia, 
Thailand, and Vietnam.”232  Diaspora funding of the LTTE enabled the procurement of 
arms and ammunition along with a fleet of cargo ships to conduct smuggling operations.  
The LTTE used Thailand as a logistic shipping hub for its illicit activity.233  The first of 
these ships was discovered and destroyed in February 1996 by the SLN when it was 
unloading weapons off the northeast coast of Sri Lanka.  Another vessel was destroyed 
during SLN patrols in November 1997 along the northeast coast.234   
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The warehouse ships, which had no name, national flag or port of registry, 
would loiter about [1,000 nautical miles] from Sri Lanka and then advance 
to within [200 nautical miles] of the coast to transfer armaments to LTTE-
operated fishing trawlers, which were escorted by the Sea Tiger fighting 
cadres and suicide boats.  The logistics trawlers would ferry the equipment 
to Sri Lanka.235 
When Vice Admiral Wasantha Karanngoda took command of the Sri Lanka Navy 
in September 2005, he immediately took a more aggressive and comprehensive approach 
to LTTE maritime operations.  He mobilized his forces to track down and destroy the 
LTTE fleet.  Operations began with an attempt to identify and destroy the LTTE fishing 
trawler fleet responsible for smuggling operations.  Within a year, eleven LTTE trawlers 
had been destroyed.236  The SLN used land-based radars to detect small boat threats up to 
100 nautical miles from shore.  Ships and boats were dispatched to chase down the 
potential threats.  However, the operations took a significant toll on the SLN.  The bulk 
of the Navy’s assets were on continuous patrol to detect and destroy the LTTE trawlers 
hiding among thousands of civilian fishing vessels, which resulted in worn down and 
demoralized crews, while having little impact on smuggling operations.237   
By mid-2006, Karanngoda changed tactics—rather than chase the small vessels, 
he decided to better utilize intelligence to target the LTTE cargo vessels, or “floating 
arms warehouses,” that supplied the small boats.  Under Karanngoda’s command, the 
SLN, with international support, hunted down and destroyed the remaining LTTE cargo 
ships.  “Between September 2006 and October 2007, the SLN succeeded in destroying 
eight large LTTE warehouse ships containing over 10,000 tons of war-related 
material.”238  Vice Admiral Karannagoda later described the contents of the ships: 
These vessels were carrying over 80,000 artillery rounds, over 100,000 
mortar rounds, a bullet-proof jeep, three aircraft in dismantled form, 
torpedoes and surface-to-air missiles.  There were a large number of 
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underwater swimmer delivery vehicles and a large quantity of diving 
equipment.  There was radar equipment as well as outboard motors with 
high horsepower.239 
The process of locating and destroying the LTTE cargo vessels required a 
coordinated and sustained effort.  Sri Lanka successfully located the floating arms 
warehouses through both domestic and international intelligence gathering.  A Sri Lankan 
Navy officer described his experience with the first attempts to track down the LTTE 
vessels: 
It all began in 2006 when we started to conduct aerial reconnaissance.  
The Indian Navy sent a Dornier aircraft to Colombo.  I was the first one to 
go onboard.  We went to the equator on an aerial patrol.  We spotted one 
ship without [hull identification] and we came back and reported it.  We 
sent our ships to go after the vessel but by the time they arrived, the ship 
had gone...  Sri Lanka began its own reconnaissance effort with navy 
aircraft and India continued to conduct aerial missions to locate the LTTE 
ships.240 
In addition to cooperation with India, the United States also provided intelligence 
to the SLN on the location of the LTTE arms warehouses.  Through the collection of 
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), U.S. Pacific Command 
passed the location of the LTTE cargo vessels to Sri Lankan Naval commanders.241  The 
intelligence proved critical in locating the more remote LTTE vessels that were loitering 
more than a thousand nautical miles from Sri Lankan waters.242   
Sri Lanka also maintained its own military intelligence corps.  Under the 
Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), the Army, Navy, and Police forces all 
maintained a dedicated intelligence community.  They did not have the high technology 
capabilities of larger militaries, so they had to rely primarily on HUMINT for information 
that came mainly from interrogations of captured LTTE cadre.243  In May 2007, the 
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Maldives Coast Guard intercepted a group of LTTE cadres attempting to capture an 
Indian fishing trawler for use as a smuggling platform.  The SLN was allowed to 
interrogate the LTTE members.  “This enabled the Navy to obtain first hand information 
regarding the LTTE fleet operating on the high seas as they had been engaged in moving 
armaments from the LTTE fleet to the Vanni using fishing trawlers.”244 
Tactical HUMINT operations in the LTTE controlled fishing villages were 
complicated by the difficulties of infiltrating agents yet provided the “primary 
information” on LTTE maritime operations nonetheless.245  Despite the difficulties, the 
remaining LTTE floating arms warehouses were located through the combined efforts of 
domestic HUMINT collection, Indian and Sri Lankan naval reconnaissance missions, and 
SIGINT and IMINT assistance from the United States.  Once the LTTE vessels were 
located, the SLN had to develop tactics to interdict the vessels that were located well 
beyond the SLN’s normal capability to conduct operations (see Figure 2).   
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Figure 2.   Map of SLN operations to destroy the LTTE arms smuggling fleet.246 
In the year between September 2006 and October 2007, the SLN interdicted and 
destroyed the remaining eight LTTE arms warehouses using a flotilla of three offshore 
patrol vessels (OPV) supported by “old tankers, merchant vessels, and fishing 
trawlers.”247 (See Figure 2).  A Sri Lankan Navy officer described the operation: 
We had to make do with what we had.  We had large fishing tenders and 
we sent them out from Colombo and Trincomalee but did not tell them 
where they were going—only the captain knew.  Once they reached 
outside Sri Lanka’s telecommunication range, the ship’s crew were briefed 
on where they were going.  Fuel was loaded into our LST craft and sent 
out to refuel the SLN OPV’s.  Ninety percent of the navy did not know 
about the operations to destroy the LTTE ships.248 
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Figure 3.   Destruction of LTTE vessel on September 10, 2007.249 
2.  Countering Maritime Terrorism and Sea Piracy 
The SLN also had to counter LTTE maritime terrorism and sea piracy operations 
affecting military movements, logistic operations, and commercial shipping.  In the mid-
1980s, the SLN began purchasing Israeli Dvora-class Fast Attack Craft (FAC) along with 
Shanghai-class fast gunboats and other coastal craft to meet its coastal defense and 
interdiction requirements.250  Since the formation of the Sea Tigers in 1984, they 
“destroyed between a third and half of the Sri Lankan navy’s coastal fleet.”251  The Sea 
Tigers used swarm tactics combined with suicide boats to overwhelm and destroy SLN 
vessels.  The first suicide attack by the Sea Tigers against a SLN vessel occurred in 
1994.252  More significant, an October 2000 attack crippled a SLN-operated ferry used to 
transport troops to and from the Jaffna peninsula.  The suicide craft were able to follow a 
cargo vessel into the Trincomalee harbor in order to get close enough to attack the ferry.  
“A total of five suicide craft were involved: two were destroyed by the SLN, two others 
escaped despite one being damaged, while the fifth completed its mission 
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successfully.”253  Prior to the Sri Lankan Army regaining control of Elephant Pass in 
early 2009, “the entire responsibility of transporting 40,000 to 50,000 members” of the 
Sri Lankan military and Police forces along with food, supplies, arms and ammunition, 
rested with the SLN.254  The more common attacks were on the Dvora fast attack craft 
(FAC) responsible for patrolling the littorals.  In a January 2006 attack, a Sea Tiger 
suicide craft hid among a cluster of fishing vessels at night.  When the FAC patrolling the 
area was in range, it rammed the suicide craft into the FAC, killing fifteen SLN 
sailors.255  In 2006 alone, the “SLN had 21 encounters with the Sea Tigers.”256   
Sea piracy by the Sea Tigers also proved to be a frequent threat in the coastal 
regions of Sri Lanka.  Some of the large cargos vessels commandeered by the Sea Tigers 
included the “Irish Mona (August 1995), Princess Wave (August 1996), Athena (May 
1997), Misen (July 1997), Morong Bong (July 1997), Cordiality (Sept 1997) and Princess 
Kash (August 1998)” and the MV Farah III (December 2006).257  A Sri Lankan Navy 
officer described the most recent incident: 
The Jordanian ship Farah III coming from India, became disabled, and 
began drifting into the land area in which the LTTE had control.  The 
LTTE boarded the ship and took it close to shore then beached it and made 
a base out of it.  They used the ship and its radars and communications 
equipment as a platform to launch attacks.  The ship was also full of rice, 
which they also used.  The ship’s crew were all released.  They were taken 
by small boat to the beach… and through the ICRC the crew were 
transferred to Colombo.258 
Even more significant, “a ship with a cargo of 32,000 mortar shells from 
Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI) left the Mozambican port of Beira on May 23, 
1997” on its way to Colombo to resupply the Sri Lankan military.  The ship never arrived 
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and ZDI claimed that the Limassol, an LTTE cargo vessel, offloaded the munitions at sea 
under the guise of Sri Lankan government authority.259 
To counter both maritime terrorism and sea piracy, Vice Admiral Karannagoda 
developed an innovative scheme he termed the “Small Boat Concept.”  The scheme was 
based on new equipment, designed by Sri Lanka’s Naval Research and Development 
Project Office, and new tactics that “effectively copied the Sea Tigers’ asymmetric 
tactics, but on a much larger scale.”260   
The Small Boat Concept came into innovation from [Vice Admiral 
Karannagoda] because whenever we patrolled in the LTTE coastal areas, 
the Sea Tigers would attack us with 20 to 30 boats.  In those 20 to 30 
boats, there would be five or six suicide boats that were indistinguishable 
from the rest of the boats but were filled with explosives.  When we were 
fighting swarm tactics, they had more of a chance of hitting us.  So, we 
went back to their techniques and developed small boats on our own.  
When they attacked us with 20, we responded with 50.261 
  The purpose of the Small Boat Concept was to counter the Sea Tigers’ swarm 
and suicide tactics by overwhelming them with “large numbers of small high-speed, 
heavily armed inshore patrol craft (IPC).”262  The R&D engineers developed three, 
indigenously produced, fiberglass-based IPC variants: a 17-meter command and fighting 
craft, a 14-meter fighting craft, and a 23-foot “Arrow.”  The craft were fitted with 250-
horsepower outboard engines (two engines for the Arrow and four for the 14-meter and 
17-meter craft), providing a top speed of between 35 and 40 nautical miles per hour.  
They were armed with various combinations of .50-caliber machine guns, double- and 
single-barreled 23 mm guns, and 40 mm Automatic Grenade Launchers (AGL).263   
The boats were organized into six-boat units under one commander.  One larger 
boat (17-meters) provided a command platform with the remaining made up of smaller 
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boats.  The 17-meter boat had the communication systems in order to facilitate command 
and control.264  These units were organized into Rapid Action Boat Squadrons (RABS) 
totaling 25 to 30 craft.265   
RABS personnel were hand-picked from the naval community who were 
willing to fight and make it through the extensive training on boat 
handling and weaponry. … Advanced training was conducted with U.S. 
Navy SEALS.  They brought their RHIB boats out to train with us twice a 
year.  They came with a whole lot of training operators and staff.  The 
training lasted for about two months at a time.266 
The squadrons were then stationed in high-threat locations along the northern and 
eastern coast to enable them to rapidly respond to and interdict Sea Tiger units at sea.267 
(See Figure 4).  Additionally, the squadrons were flexible enough to relocate in short 
order to combine with other squadrons for specific operations or battles.  “The SLN’s 
ability to concentrate a force at short notice that was able to confront the Sea Tigers was 
an important factor in gaining the upper hand in sea battles.”268 
Naval camps were set up along the northern and eastern coast to provide bases for 
the RABS and land-based radar systems (see Figure 4).  The radars proved to be another 
essential element of the SLN’s ability to defeat the Sea Tigers.  In 2006, small land-based 
radar stations were set up along the coast from Point Pedro in the north to Trincomalee in 
the east.  The only area not covered was an LTTE stronghold between Chundikkulam and 
Mullaittivu.269 (See Figure 4).  “In November 2007, the United States provided Sri Lanka 
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SLN’s ability to detect and interdict Sea Tiger activities.270  The Communications Officer 
at Naval Headquarters in Colombo at the time, made the following comments about U.S. 
assistance: 
The United States was tremendously helpful with our command and 
control systems.  The backbone of our networking was set up by the U.S.  
We had communications in place but the U.S. helped us network our 
communications and radar systems so that there was direct real-time 
communications with Naval Headquarters in Colombo.  In the later part of 
the war, we had the ability to view about 20 radar stations at 
Headquarters.271 
 
Figure 4.   Sri Lanka's Layered Defense System.272 
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With the RABS, maritime surveillance systems, and improved command and 
control, the SLN implemented a system of layered defense to counter maritime terrorism, 
sea piracy, and smuggling.  The first layer consisted of RABS stationed along the coast to 
rapidly respond to coastal threats.  Next, the Dvora Fast Attack Craft (FAC) maintained 
constant patrols to detect illicit activity.  Fast gunboats provided another layer seaward of 
the FAC’s patrol routes.  Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) provided the final cordon 200 to 
300 nautical miles off the coast.  Complete radar coverage of the area also assisted in 
alerting the SLN to Sea Tiger activity.273  The layered defense provided the SLN with a 
comprehensive approach to counter LTTE threats. 
3.  Result of Maritime Interdiction Operations 
The Sri Lankan Navy’s maritime interdiction operations proved invaluable to the 
defeat of the Tamil Tigers.  Aggressive and coordinated operations led to the destruction 
of the LTTE arms smuggling network by the SLN.  By preventing access to illicit arms, 
“the LTTE was forced to go back to rudimentary tactics like using improvised mortars 
and rockets instead of military grade munitions and arms.”274  Facing desperate LTTE 
rebels, Sri Lankan ground forces rapidly liberated LTTE-controlled areas with far fewer 
casualties.275   
The SLN was also able to establish maritime dominance in its coastal waters.  
Through innovative tactics and an indigenous boat-building program, the SLN 
implemented its Small Boat Concept to counter Sea Tiger swarm and suicide attacks.  
The RABS deployed throughout island to augment the layered defenses of the Dvora 
FAC, Fast gunboats, and OPVs.  The result was fourfold.  First, smuggling operations 
across Palk Strait reduced drastically.  Next, the LTTE’s Sea Lines of Communication 
(SLOCs) were eliminated, thereby preventing attacks from the sea or the insertion or 
extraction of ground forces by sea.  Additionally, the Sri Lankan military regained 
control of the SLOCs, thus impeding sea piracy and maritime terrorism.  Finally, during 
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the concluding months of the war, a naval blockade of the seaward access to the final 
LTTE stronghold prevented the escape of top LTTE leadership.276  The effective use of 
the Sri Lankan Navy was a critical factor in enabling ground forces to decisively defeat 
the rebels. 
C. FINAL GROUND OFFENSIVE 
In April 2006, the LTTE walked away from the peace process and returned to 
widespread violence.  Following a series of assassinations and bombings, on July 21, 
2006, the LTTE closed the sluice gates of the Mavil Aru reservoir in the Trincomalee 
district of eastern Sri Lanka.277  Nearly 30,000 people in government-controlled areas 
depended on the reservoir water for drinking and irrigation.  After failed negotiations, the 
GoSL launched Operation Watershed to regain control of the Mavil Aru reservoir.278  By 
August 8, 2006, the military had reclaimed Mavil Aru but LTTE attacks continued in the 
east.279  The Sri Lankan Naval base at Trincomalee was targeted with artillery fire from 
across the bay at Sampoor.  The military shifted its offensive to Sampoor, first by 
softening the LTTE with artillery and aerial bombardment.  Then, they deployed special 
force elements in coordination with infantry battalions to wrap up the operation.280  On 
September 4, 2006, the military defeated the LTTE in Sampoor and turned their focus 
southward to the remaining areas of LTTE control in the eastern province.   
On the momentum of the successes in Tricomalee and Sampoor, the Eastern 
campaign continued on December 4, 2006 in the Batticoloa district.281  Ground 
operations over the coming months provided the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) with the ability 
to test new tactics prior to moving into the LTTE’s stronghold in the north.  General 
Fonseka and his commanders developed tactics that minimized the limitations of using 
large conventional forces against LTTE guerrilla elements.  Long Range Reconnaissance 
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Patrol (LRRP) teams were introduced as deep penetration units inserted well in advance 
of conventional operations.  Fonseka later described his reasoning: “We were far too slow 
to take on the smaller and quicker terrorist teams in the past.  So I decided to form the 8-
man teams, who were independent, mobile, and lethal.”282  The eight-man Special Forces 
teams “went behind enemy lines, assassinating Tigers, crippling infrastructure in rebel-
held areas and reporting target locations to the army and air force.”283  The SLA was 
assisted in their operations by paramilitary forces led by former-LTTE leader Colonel 
Karuna.284  In June 2007, the GoSL gained full control of the Eastern province for the 
first time in fourteen years.285   
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Figure 5.   Northern Offensive.286 
 
With a newfound confidence, the Sri Lankan military turned their fight to the 
Northern campaign in the vast area of the Wanni, the region between the Jaffna peninsula 
and the southern FDL.  In preparation for the operation, Fonseka positioned two divisions 
in Jaffna and three divisions (supported by several Task Forces) along the southern FDL 
(see Figure 5).  Instead of concentrating on a single front, simultaneous offensive 
operations were launched along the seventy-mile southern defense line.287  Operations 
commenced in September 2007 in Mannar (northwest), Vavuniya (north central), and 
Weli Oya (northeast) along the FDL.  The multi-front offensive resulted in the LTTE 
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dispersing its forces in order to attempt to halt the SLA operations.288  However, the 
LTTE lacked the manpower and firepower to confront the SLA’s aggressive tactics.  
Fonseka later described the tactics: 
One of the many unconventional things that we did in Eelam War IV was 
not to depend too much on the traditional supply routes.  The LTTE 
expected us to march on, hugging the roads.  But my troops were more 
than willing to abandon the conventional way.  They marched through 
jungles, waded through chest deep water under pouring rain, and yet kept 
going forward.  This took the terrorists by surprise.  They had never seen 
the Army adopt such tactics.  Those were supposed to be LTTE tactics in 
many people’s eyes.  But my commanders and troops showed adaptability 
and daring in turning the conventional strategies on their head to totally 
confuse and annihilate the terrorists.289 
As military operations progressed, the entire northeastern coast fell back under 
government control by November 2008.  This opened a new land route to the Jaffna 
peninsula, which was previously supplied only by sea and air.290  Killinochchi and 
Elephant Pass were the next to fall as the two SLA divisions in Jaffna pushed south, 
meeting the northbound divisions.291   
By March 2009, the LTTE was corralled into an area less than 30 square 
kilometers.292  As a desperate measure, the LTTE used civilians as human shields to slow 
SLA advances.  Concern for civilian casualties complicated the operation with an 
estimated 250,000 civilians in the area still under LTTE control.293  In April 2009, the 
GoSL established a 20-square-kilometer No Fire Zone (NFZ) for civilians to take 
refuge.294  The NFZ also provided the 2,000 remaining LTTE rebels a sanctuary, though 
a diminishing one.  As the weeks progressed, the NFZ was condensed down to a “narrow 
stretch of land opening to the Indian Ocean from the east and to the Nanthikadal lagoon 
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from the west.”295  Tens of thousands of civilians were allowed to leave the No Fire Zone 
in the final weeks.296  Beginning early morning on May 17, 2009, the remaining LTTE 
rebels made several attempts to breach the Army’s cordon.  Each attack consisted of 
hundreds of rebels, some breaching the first line of SLA defenses but their advances 
ultimately ending by a second line of defense.297  Early on May 19, 2009, several Special 
Force teams deployed into the last remaining LTTE area and killed the remaining rebels.  
Among the bodies was the LTTE founder and leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran.298  With 
the exception of the chief arms procurer, Kumaran Pathmanathan, all the top leadership 
of the LTTE were killed during Eelam IV.  Pathmanathan is in Sri Lankan custody after 
being arrested in August 2009 in Thailand.299  The twenty-six-year civil war was finally 
declared over on May 19, 2009. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Sri Lanka’s civil war cost the nation between 80,000 and 100,000 lives since the 
war began in 1983.  In the final thirty-three months of fighting, during Eelam IV, 22,000 
militants, 13,000 civilians, and nearly 4,000 government force personnel were killed.300  
While this was a high price to pay, twenty-six years of civil war appeared to demonstrate 
that third-party interventions in Sri Lanka only extended the conflict, added to its 
humanitarian costs, and only produced stalemate, one which perhaps benefited the rebels, 
but certainly not the government.  Only in a post-9/11 world less tolerant of “terrorism” 
was the government of Sri Lanka able to garner enough international support to seek a 
military victory.  The GoSL was supported with military training, arms, equipment, and 
intelligence from a host of nations.  However, an important component of victory proved 
to be the ability of the Sri Lankan Navy through maritime interdiction to attack and 
disrupt the LTTE logistic network responsible for smuggling arms into the country.  In 
the end, this created an imbalance that allowed the military decisively to defeat the 
LTTE.   
A. INTERVENTION IN CONFLICT 
India’s direct intervention in Sri Lanka’s conflict had detrimental effects.  Instead 
of halting violence and negotiating peace, India’s involvement perpetuated the conflict.  
First, India stepped in at a time when the Sri Lankan military was poised to defeat the 
rebels.  Intervention by India at this critical moment prevented saved the LTTE from 
imminent defeat.  Had the GoSL been permitted to defeat Tamil extremists, a peace with 
moderate Tamils could have occurred.  The introduction of the Indian Peacekeeping 
Forces (IPKF) into Sri Lanka caused both the LTTE and the GoSL to conclude that the 
IPKF posed a greater threat than did their indigenous enemy.  They colluded to expel the 
IPKF and then quickly resumed their war once India decided that intervention had been 
too costly. 
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The Norwegian-led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), put in place to 
monitor a 2002 ceasefire agreement (CFA), also failed in its attempt to bring about a 
negotiated peace.  The CFA did reduce violence for four years.  However, time did not 
work in the interest of peace because of several critical events that took place.  First, the 
2004 defection of Colonel Karuna and his 6,000 cadres from the LTTE weakened 
Prabakharan militarily and diminished his position as the sole representative of the 
Tamils.  By 2006, the Karuna faction was actually fighting for the GoSL against their 
former LTTE comrades.301  Second, the tsunami of December 2004 killed an estimated 
1,000 rebels and destroyed a significant portion of the LTTE’s military equipment in the 
east.302  Finally, the events of 9/11 made the international political environment less 
tolerant of terrorist violence.  In addition, political support gave Sri Lanka the time 
needed to regroup, rearm, and return to fighting in a much stronger position.    
B. PREPARING FOR THE FINAL OFFENSIVE 
With support of the international community, Sri Lanka was able to isolate and 
overpower the LTTE militants.  China, Russia, Ukraine, Israel, India, Pakistan, the 
United States, and others provided military support to Sri Lanka.  In 2007, Sri Lanka’s 
largest arms supplier, China, signed a $37.6-million deal to supply Sri Lanka with 
ammunition and ordnance.303  They also supplied fast gunboats and donated six F7 
fighter aircraft in 2008.304  Russia supplied transport helicopters and other weaponry.305  
Ukraine sold four MiG-27 fighters to Sri Lanka in 2007.  Israel supplied three Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles and several Dvora Fast Attack Craft.306  Pakistan supplied tanks, rocket 
launchers, mortars, and communications equipment.307  India supplied fast attack craft, 
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military radars, logistical equipment, helicopters, and offshore patrol vessels (OPV).308  
The United States provided small arms systems, OPVs, small boats, and a maritime 
surveillance system.309  In addition to material support, India, Pakistan, and the United 
States provided advanced military training and shared critical intelligence information 
with Sri Lanka.310  By establishing an extensive network of military suppliers and 
trainers, Sri Lanka gained an edge against the LTTE.   
International support, by itself, was not going to win the war in Sri Lanka.  In late 
2005, the newly elected President Mahinda Rajapaksa put the country on a course to 
militarily end to the war.  He began by placing his brother, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, to head 
the military as Defense Secretary and named Major General Sarath Fonseka as the top 
Army commander.311  Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda assumed command of the 
Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) shortly before President Rajapaksa took office.  Air Marshal 
Roshan Goonatilake was later appointed as Commander of the Air Force in June 2006.312  
The leaders transformed the military into a force capable and determined to defeat the 
LTTE.  In 2006, the Sri Lankan Army increased its ranks by 40,000 personnel and 
restructured its leadership by placing aggressive commanders in key positions.313  The 
SLN grew from 15,000 in 2005 to nearly 50,000 in 2008 in order to support the rapid 
expansion of small boat units.314  With new aggressive and skilled leadership in place, 
the military turned its focus to tactics and operations to defeat the LTTE. 
Through the introduction of innovative tactics, the Sri Lankan military was able to 
offset the LTTE’s advantages in guerrilla warfare and maritime terrorism.  The army 
developed Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) teams to minimize the limitations 
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of using a large conventional force against LTTE guerrilla elements.315  The navy 
developed the Small Boat Concept (SBC) to counter Sea Tiger swarm and suicide 
tactics.316  Indigenously manufactured small boats were produced by the hundreds to 
support the SBC.317  The air force enhanced its capability to conduct air raids and 
casualty evacuation in support of ground operations.318  With an effective fighting force 
in place, the government began operations to weaken the LTTE’s military capability by 
disrupting its logistic network prior to commencing large-scale offensive operations.    
C. TARGETING THE LOGISTICS NETWORK 
The SLN was best suited to take on the responsibility of countering LTTE arms 
smuggling operations in Sri Lanka.  Tamil diaspora funded LTTE operations through a 
business conglomerate generating an estimated $300 million per year.319  In the 1990s, 
the LTTE purchased a fleet of cargo vessels and set up logistics operations for arms 
smuggling in Burma then later in Thailand.320  Vice Admiral Karanngoda promptly 
focused his navy on disrupting the smuggling network.  “Between September 2006 and 
October 2007, the SLN succeeded in destroying eight large LTTE warehouse ships 
containing over 10,000 tons of war-related material.”321  With the elimination of the 
entire LTTE cargo fleet, arms smuggling was reduced by more than 80 percent.322 
The remaining arms were smuggled into Sri Lanka via fishing trawlers across the 
Palk Strait from Tamil Nadu.  Counter-smuggling operations in this area were 
complicated by the Sea Tiger’s control of the northeastern coastal seas using swarm and 
suicide tactics against the SLN.  Karanngoda countered the LTTE tactics with the 
implementation of his Small Boat Concept.  The scheme “effectively copied the Sea 
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Tigers’ asymmetric tactics, but on a much larger scale.”323  The SLN overwhelmed the 
Sea Tigers with large numbers of small, high-speed, heavily armed small boats organized 
into squadrons of 25 to 30 boats.324  The Rapid Action Boat Squadrons (RABS) were 
stationed in high-threat locations along the northern and eastern coast to enable them to 
rapidly respond to and interdict Sea Tiger units at sea.325  Beginning in 2006, the SLN 
also set up land-based maritime radar stations along the northern and eastern coasts to 
assist in detecting and interdicting Sea Tiger incursions.  With RABS and maritime 
surveillance augmenting patrols by Dvora FAC, Fast gunboats, and OPVs, a 
comprehensive system of layered defense was in place to reestablish control of the sea 
lines of communication (SLOC) in the northern seas.  Control of the SLOCs nearly 
eliminated the remaining arms smuggling operations and had a complementing effect of 
impeding sea piracy and maritime terrorism.  Once the LTTE logistic network was 
severed, Sri Lankan ground forces began major offensive operations.  Once ammunition 
stockpiles were depleted, “the LTTE was forced to go back to rudimentary tactics like 
using improvised mortars and rockets instead of military grade munitions and arms.”326  
Facing LTTE rebels desperately weakened by a lack of materiel, Sri Lankan ground 
forces rapidly liberated LTTE-controlled areas with far fewer casualties.327 
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